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Abstract
A key policy problem in most developing countries is the size of the informal
sector and its persistence over time. At the same time, these countries also need
to increase their tax take. However, this may slow down the formalization of
the economy. Evidence on the wages and characteristics of jobs in diﬀerent
sectors and on the impact of tax changes on the size of the informal sector in
developing countries is, however, very limited. This paper therefore estimates
the tax responsiveness of the extensive margin of formality, i.e. the propensity
to participate in formal work as opposed to working as an informal worker,for
four Sub-Saharan African countries. Using repeated cross-sections of household
data and applying grouping estimator techniques, this paper ﬁnds only very
small or statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects of taxes on the extent of formal work.
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1 Introduction
In most developing countries the informal sector is substantial in size. A recent survey
by Charmes (2012) provides comparable information about the size of the informal
sector in diﬀerent countries. According to his numbers, the share of the informal
sector in non-agricultural employment was on average 58% in Latin America in 2005-
10, whereas it was much larger in Sub-Saharan Africa (approximately around 66%).
In addition to its large size, the informal economy shows no clear declining trend. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, according to Charmes (2012), the informal employment share
was around the same in 2005-10 as it was in the 1980s.
Almost by deﬁnition, the informal sector falls outside the tax base available to
governments, who are under pressure, internally and from donors, to raise their tax
revenues. Besides, domestic tax revenue mobilization is also one of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). While countries in Africa have been able to increase
their tax take since the early 2000s, (see Figure 1, which provides information about
the tax revenue to GDP ratio for selected African countries and for Sub-Saharan
Africa on average), one observes a large heterogeneity across countries and one can
still argue that more revenues would be needed to be able to ﬁnance necessary de-
velopmental spending. Rising inequality is also a concern in Africa, and one way
of reducing inequalities could be raising more taxes using progressive income taxes.
However, currently African countries obtain generally very little tax revenues using
direct taxes on labour income (Figure 2).
There may easily be a trade oﬀ between the two needs, the desire to generate
more jobs within the formal sector and the goal of raising more revenues  perhaps
especially using the labour income tax  which may create to disincentive to formalize.
Productive enterprises of course may choose whether to operate in the formal or
informal sector. It is highly likely that one of the most important margins of response
of economic behavior to changes in tax and transfer policies in developing countries
is the extent of formal work. Besley and Persson (2013) note that this elasticity is
also a quantitatively important ingredient of the elasticity of taxable income, which
is a suﬃcient statistic that determines the size of the distortions the tax system
creates also in the presence of informality. The severity of these distortions can the
be weighed against the distributional gains that can be achieved by the tax system.1
How large is the potential trade oﬀ? To be able to answer this question, one
would need to obtain credible information about the responsiveness of the share of
the formal sector with respect to the labour income tax wedge. From the outset it
1This approach has proven very valuable in modern empirical public ﬁnance, see Piketty and
Saez (2013).
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is however not even clear that an individual would necessarily prefer working in the
formal sectors. While much of the traditional literature (e.g. Fields (1975)) suggests
that formally employed people earn more and informal employment is an escape
from unemployment while looking for formal employment, this view has recently
been challenged by studies on evidence for voluntary informal employment (Hen-
ley et al. (2009); Bargain and Kwenda (2011); Maloney (1999); Maloney (2004)and
Bruhn and McKenzie (2013) (see Bargain and Kwenda (2011) for a more detailed
discussion)). Moreover, Badaoui et al. (2008) do not ﬁnd evidence for a wage gap
between the two sectors when controlling for other characteristics. Related to this
question, Bargain and Kwenda (2010) pointed out that the nature of the informal em-
ployment (e.g informal self-employment or informal salaried work) has an impact on
the formalinformal earnings gap and that this gap is also aﬀected by the individual's
position along the income distribution, but that the eﬀect of these two aspects diﬀers
across countries. Hence, the sensitivity of the decision to work in the formal sector
may additionally be moderated by the varying pay premium for formal sector work
by country, type of work and income level. Recent quasi-experimental econometric
work on this topic does exist, especially for Latin American countries. However, we
are not aware of any studies on this matter for low or lower middle-income African
countries, where the trade oﬀ could be even more severe than in Latin America. In
Latin America, larger social protection systems are already in place, whereas similar
programmes are being scaled up in African countries. Therefore, the needed increase
in the tax rate to ﬁnance such programmes may well be greater in Africa. At the
same time the diﬀerent scale and type of available beneﬁts for formal workers and
diﬀerent tax systems may aﬀect the incentives of workers to formalize and thus the
elasticity of formal work.
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to provide new evidence of the elasticity
of formal work using representative household data from four Sub-Saharan African
countries.2 Building on the approach developed by Blundell et al. (1998), the idea is
to utilize a number of tax and beneﬁt reforms that treat diﬀerent groups of individuals
diﬀerently. These provide a large amount of exogenous variation to the relative
attractiveness of working in the formal sector, which is needed for reliable causal
estimates of the impacts of ﬁscal policies on formality. To the best of our knowledge,
2While recent work on the eﬀectiveness of policies lowering the costs to formalize a business,
targeted at informal businesses in developing countries by Bruhn and McKenzie (2014) in general
and more speciﬁcally on Benin by Benhassine et al. (2018), has questioned the cost eﬀectiveness
of incentivizing informal business to formalized in the light of prospective tax revenues from these
ﬁrms in the near future, our study only focuses on the sensitivity of the probability to formalize
based on passively induced tax incentives to formalize.
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this paper oﬀers the ﬁrst estimates of the impacts of taxes on formal sector work
for African countries  with the exception of South Africa  that are based on a
modern, credible, estimation strategy.3 Given the very diﬀerent state and nature
of social beneﬁts and tax systems in African countries than in South America, this
study can provide important evidence from a diﬀerent geographic areas and countries
in a diﬀerent stage of development, which can inform about the external validity of
earlier results from South America. An additional important contribution of the
paper is that we provide a considerable amount of descriptive material about the
diﬀerences (with a special reference to their earnings) between formal and informal
sector workers in Africa. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there is not much earlier
empirical work on this matter.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section, we provide a review of earlier
relevant work, which, as was mentioned above, largely focuses on Latin America.
Section 3 provides the theoretical background and the econometric strategy of the
paper. Section 4 presents the data and some descriptive statistics. The results are
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Starting more generally, formality status as such is a debated term. The literature
has deﬁned it in multiple ways, resulting in diﬀerent levels of formality and diﬀerent
people being classiﬁed as either formal or informal, which do not neccessarily overlap
(Henley et al. 2009). While the terms informal sector and informal workers are often
used interchangeably, the literature distinguishes, according to Henley et al. (2009),
between three main alternative deﬁnitions of formality status: The ﬁrst purely relies
on a contract status whether a worker is formally or informally employed, the sec-
ond is based on whether an individual contributes to social security and the third
distiguishes between salaried employees in ﬁrms with more than ﬁve employees as
being formal and self-employed or own account workers, who are not professionals,
as being informal. If an individual is self-employed but contributes to social secu-
rity, the person would, according to the ﬁrst deﬁnition, be classiﬁed as informally
3While high-quality data for South Africa would be available, we left South Africa outside of the
sample because of the large institutional diﬀerences between South Africa and poorer Sub-Saharan
African countries. In South Africa, unemployment is close to 30%, there are unemployment beneﬁts,
and the formal sector is fairly large, whereas in other African countries, unemployment rates are low,
unemployment insurance beneﬁts are largely inexistant, and people typically work in the informal
sector partly due to lack of formal sector jobs. See Bhorat et al. (2014) and Tondini et al. (2017)for
recent quasi-experimental evidence regarding the employment eﬀects of wage costs in South Africa.
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employed. According to the third deﬁnition, they would be working in the informal
sector whereas according to the second deﬁnition they would be a formal worker.
Hence, the deﬁnition of formality status matters and consistency in its deﬁntion over
time and accross countries is highly important.
While there is an extensive literature comparing the characteristics of the formal
and informal sector in developing countries, the literature looking at the impact of
changes in taxes and transfers on choices of workers (or sometimes ﬁrms) to partici-
pate in the formal sector is much smaller. Some of this takes the form of calibration
models, of which an important example is Albrecht et al. (2009). They look at the
choices of workers to be in the formal sector, informal sector or to move between
the two, and simulate what would be the eﬀect of changes in payroll taxes and sev-
erance payments on the size of the informal sector. Not surprisingly an increase in
the severance tax encourages workers to leave the formal sector and join the infor-
mal sector, and a reduction in payroll tax has the opposite eﬀect. Other calibration
models include those by Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2013), who look at the eﬀect of
changes in taxes and transfers, especially unemployment insurance, on the size of the
informal sector Alonso-Ortiz and Leal (2013),who use a calibration model to consider
the responsiveness of informality to taxes and transfers in Mexico and Feltenstein
and Shamloo (2013), who simulate the eﬀect of tax reform in Russia on the size of
the underground economy there.
In terms of empirical studies, the only study we are aware of for African countries
is that of Auriol and Warlters (2012), who develop a simple general equilibrium model
for 38 African countries. The paper does not contain estimates or quasi-experimental
evidence about the impacts of the tax burden on the extent of formal work, but it
rather provides a simulation analysis and calculates marginal cost of public funds for
various tax instruments.
These issues have been studied in much greater detail in Latin America, and to a
lesser extent in transition countries or in other parts of the world. Lora and Fajardo-
González (2016) have examined the eﬀects of payroll taxes, value-added taxes and
corporate income taxes on a variety of labor market outcomes such as participation,
employment, informality, and wages in 15 Latin American countries using macro-
level panel data. The eﬀects of each tax are markedly diﬀerent and may depend
on several aspects of labor and tax institutions. Payroll taxes reduce employment
and increase labor costs when their beneﬁts are not valued by workers, but they can
also increase labor participation and lower labor costs. Value-added taxes increase
informality and reduce skilled labor demand.
Many other studies have taken a micro approach. Kugler and Kugler (2009) using
plant level data for Colombia ﬁnd that a 10% increase in payroll taxes leads to reduc-
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tion in formal employment of between 4 and 5%. Antón (2014), also for Colombia,
ﬁnds that a fall in payroll taxes increased employment overall and formal employ-
ment in particular. Using a panel of administrative records of employees Morales
and Medina (2017) estimate a signiﬁcant increase in formal sector employment as a
result of 13.5% reduction in the payroll taxes in Colombia. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed
by Fernandez and Villar (2017) who estimate a 4.8% reduction in informality of the
same reform using household survey data. Besides, Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) and
Zarkovi¢-Raki¢ et al. (2016) looked at tax reforms on the size of the informal economy
in Russia and Serbia respectively.
Other studies have considered the eﬀect of transfers on participation in the formal
sector. Bergolo and Cruces (2014b) look at the eﬀect of a social insurance reform
in Uruguay extending health care coverage to dependents of registered workers, and
ﬁnd that the reform increased those working in registered employment signiﬁcantly.
In another paper, also on Uruguay, Bergolo and Cruces (2014a) study the incentive
eﬀects of the social security program on labor supply using a regression discontinuity
design. In particular, they examine in detail the anatomy of behavioral responses 
responses along diﬀerent margins and the heterogeneity within the outcomes. Their
results indicate that a one percentage point increase in net income implies an about
1.7 percent increase in registered employment. Garganta and Gasparini (2015) have
studied how the Universal Child Allowance (AUH) program, i.e. an income mainte-
nance program in Argentina, aﬀects the incentives of informal workers to transition
to the formal sector labor market using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy. The ev-
idence suggests that while formalization (entry rate into registered jobs) of both
groups (eligible and non-eligible) follows an almost identical path before the end of
2009, the patterns diverge signiﬁcantly from that date, which coincides with the im-
plementation of the AUH. They found that the program has a disincentivizing eﬀect
(in contrast, there is no evidence that registered employment becomes informal).
These eﬀects apply to self-employed workers, informal salaried employees and the
unemployed, and are particularly strong for poor workers in large households and
with children of young age.
Other studies on the subject include e.g. Bosch and Campos-Vazquez (2014).
They estimate that the implementation of Mexico's Popular Health Insurance pro-
gram reduced the stock of registered employers by 3.8% and employees 2.4%. Alzúa
et al. (2012) perform a random assignment to study the eﬀect of welfare programs
on work incentives and the adult labor supply in Mexico, Nicaragua and Honduras.
The result is that the programs have not introduced any substantial disincentives to
work and that they have had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the intensive or the extensive
margin of labor supply for individuals or households in treatment localities.
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3 Theory and estimation
3.1 Conceptual framework
To ﬁx ideas, this Section presents a highly stylized model of occupational choice,
inspired by the literature on the extensive margin labour markets in public economics,
for a recent example see Jacquet et al. (2013). Suppose that the individual can either
work at the formal sector, earning income yf , or at the informal sector (or in the
shadow economy), earning income ys. If the individual works in the formal sector,
he or she pays taxes T (yf ) and obtains transfers equal to B(yf ). Thus, net income in
the state of formal work is given by xf = yf−T (yf )+B(yf ), which must be suﬃcient
to ﬁnance consumption cf (1 + t), where t is the consumption tax rate. Note that
payroll taxes aﬀect the gross salary. The labour costs to the employer, denoted by
Yf , are Yf = (1 + p)yf , which means that the gross income already encompasses the
eﬀect of payroll taxes, as gross income can also be written as Yf/1+p.
If the individual works in the informal sector, no taxes are paid, but the individual
might still be entitled to some beneﬁts, B(ys), reﬂecting the fact that social protection
programmes in developing countries often reach those working outside of the formal
sector. Net income in the state of informal work is thus xs = ys + B(ys), which is
used for consumption cs(1 + t). Note that here we assume that both, those in the
formal sector and those in the informal sector pay indirectly the value added tax.
Those who do not work at all can be treated as informal sector workers, but earning
just zero labour income.
The individual utility is linear (or log linear) in consumption, and utility when
working in the formal sector is thus xf/(1 + t) − ψ, where ψ is the cost (which can
be negative) of working at the formal sector. The costs are positive if working at
the formal sector requires e.g. a longer commute but the costs can also be negative,
if formal sector work also brings about other beneﬁts (such as retirement income).
The utility when working at the informal sector is just xs/(1 + t). This means that
the individual works at the formal sector if
xf − xs ≥ ψ(1 + t), (1)
which also means that the commodity tax does not aﬀect the choice between
formal vs. informal sector work.
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3.2 Estimation
For linear probability models, the empirical counterpart of equation 1, the probability
to work at the formal sector P (yf > 0)i,t for the individual i and at period t is
4
P (yf > 0)it = α + β × [xf − xs]it + it, (2)
where P (yf > 0) is deﬁned to take on the value of 1 if the individual supplies earnings
at the formal sector exceeding zero.5 The extensive margin formality elasticity, i.e.
the percentage change in the probability to work in the formal sector with respect
to a percentage change in the take-home pay diﬀerence between formal and informal
work, can be calculated as β × [(xf − xs)/P (yf > 0)]. Note that the estimation of
the probability to work in the formal sector does not only hinge on tax and beneﬁt
reforms, but it is also identiﬁed from shocks aﬀecting the gross pay in the two diﬀerent
states.
Estimating the equation above poses a number of challenges. First, the right-
hand side regressor is correlated with  and so endogenous. The most obvious reason
is that both taxes and beneﬁts are direct functions of income. An additional reason
is that unobserved variables (e.g., tastes for work and savings) might aﬀect the choice
of working at the formal sector. And clearly, the individual is only observed in at
most one state at a given time, so income in the other state needs to be imputed.
Our approach to tackle these issues is to utilize the repeated cross section element
of the data. This allows us to compare groups of individuals over time and, thereby,
address these endogeneity issues by constructing instruments. Following Blundell
et al. (1998), we partition the sample into group cells based on country, gender, age
and education level. The key idea behind the grouping procedure is to compare
otherwise similar groups of individuals who have been aﬀected diﬀerently by tax
reforms (the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence setting), while retaining the ambition to estimate
structurally meaningful parameters, in this case the formality elasticity.
Let g denote group cell. Suppose that it = αg + µt + ηit, where E [ηit|hit >
0, g, t] = 0. According to this assumption unobserved heterogeneity, conditional on
g and t, can be captured by a permanent group eﬀect αg and a time ﬁxed eﬀect µt.
This assumption can also be modiﬁed in such a way that it allows e.g. for education-
group-speciﬁc linear time trends. Let ωgt be a vector that contains the full set of
interactions between group and time. By assumption, these are uncorrelated with
ηit. This is the central exclusion restriction for identiﬁcation. We can then estimate
4Formally, this derivation assumes that v(y) is uniformly distributed. Ideally, one would perhaps
want to assume a normal distribution and, hence, arrive at a probit model. This would lead to the
so-called incidental parameters problem, rendering the empirical estimations unfeasible.
5The discussion in this section draws on Jäntti et al. (2015).
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P (yf > 0)it = α + β × [xf − xs]it + αg + µt + ηit, (3)
by two-stage least squares (2SLS) while using ωgt as excluded instruments for (xf −
xs). Crucially, both the order condition and the rank condition for identiﬁcation
need to hold. The order condition requires us to have at least as many instruments
as endogenous regressors (in our case, one). The rank condition requires that net
income must change at diﬀerent rates for diﬀerent groups over time. As the variation
in the second-stage equation is entirely at the group level, equation 3 can also be
estimated by collapsing the data into time-speciﬁc group averages of the relevant
variables.6 We then estimate the parameters from
P (yf > 0)gt = α + βext × (xf − xs)gt + αg + µt + ηit, (4)
by GLS, using group size as weights. Using either equation 3 or 4 yields identical
results.
To deal with missing income in either of the states, we proceed using a simple and
transparent approach utilising cell means. For single households (with or without
children) we use the cell means yf − T (yf ) +B(yf ) and ys +B(ys) to get estimates
for the net income in the states of formal work and informal work, respectively. We
average over individuals with and without formal earnings, respectively. Cells are, as
in the main speciﬁcation of the regression analysis, constructed using survey wave,
sex, educational category, and age group. Likewise, the cell mean labour income for
those whose earnings are strictly positive is used to get an estimate of the expected
income for the individual when working.
Our main approach is to utilize regression equation of the form (4), since each
individual is observed in only one state, and the wage in the counterfactual state
would need to be imputed also in individual level regressions. However, imputing
incomes allows one to run the 2SLS estimates, which can be utilized to test the
predictive power of the group*time interaction instruments in the ﬁrst stage.
Finally, grouping estimators have been shown to be sensitive to small-sample bias
(Deaton, 1985). For this reason, we limit the cell size to a minimum of 10 in the
analysis below and a minimum of 25 in robustness checks.
6See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for an interesting discussion about IV estimation on grouped
data.
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4 Data and descriptive information
This section ﬁrst discusses the data used for this analysis and thereafter presents
some descriptive statistics. This study is based on labour force survey data or labour
force modules of living standard household surveys from four Sub-Saharan African
countries: Ghana7, Rwanda8 , Tanzania9 and Uganda10 over a time period from
1991-2014. The choice of countries is geographically limited to countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. Furthermore, it is based on the size of the economy in terms of
GDP, the availability of at least two recent waves of a nationally representative survey
with individual income data11, information regarding the individuals' demographic
characteristics and either direct or indirect information concerning the individual's
formality status.12 Nevertheless, the number of observations, presented in the last
row of Table 1 and Tables A.1-A.4, shows large variation and ﬂuctuations of sample
sizes across countries and waves, whereby, based on the sample sizes ﬁndings from
Ghana may be most robust.
Besides, this study draws on minimum wage, tax rate and tax bracket information
obtained from the local tax authorities' and big four accounting ﬁrms. Annual income
data13 is inﬂation adjusted1415 and rebased to the last wave's survey year for each
country. Income levels above the 99th percentile of the distribution are considered
outliers and replaced by the cut-oﬀ value. Only individuals working and reporting
strictly positive cash income are included, whereas in-kind income is not taken into
7Ghana: Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 3 (1991), GLSS 4 (1998) , GLSS 5 (2006) and
GLSS 6 (2012)
8Rwanda: Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages (EICV, in English: In-
tegrated Household Living Conditions Survey) 1 (2000/2001), EICV 2 (2005/2006), EICV 3
(2010/2011)
9Tanzania: Integrated Labour Force Survey (ILFS) (2005/2006), ILFS (2014)
10Uganda: Uganda National Panel Survey (NPL) (2009/2010), NPL (2010/2011), NPL
(2011/2012), NPL (2013/2014)
11Given the debate in the literature concerning the reliability of income data in developing country
surveys and often used alternative is consumption data. This study focuses of surveys with income
data to avoid bias from mixing income and consumption data.
12We excluded countries with periods of major conﬂict around the time of the survey.
13Income is reported in diﬀerent frequencies (e.g. daily, weekly, monthly) and scaled to the annual
level, irrespective of the actual tenure and annual income of the job. For surveys with income
questions for the past 12 month and the past 7 days, the most recent information is considered
leading and complemented when missing with the information from the past 12 months to minimize
the recall bias as well as missing information in the income data
14Income is inﬂation adjusted at the annual level, assuming that incomes are also not adjusted
at higher frequency for inﬂation.
15Using instead hourly wage, would introduce too much noise in the data.
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consideration. Unless in salaried employment, agricultural income is excluded from
the analysis as this is assumed to be largely coming from informal subsistence farming
and data on agricultural revenues and costs is relatively noisy. Moreover, those
working in the public sector, which represent between 4%-22%16 of all non-subsistence
agricultural workers, are excluded. Public sector workers are by assumption formal
workers and are assumed to have a lower incentive to change their job in order to
change their formality statusas the tax wedge does not necessarily have the same
importance for the public sector. Quasi-public sector workers consisting of mainly
state owned enterprise employees are however included. While many individuals may
engage in more than one job, this study only considers the income from the main job,
if indicated as such and otherwise the income from the job with the highest salary17.
Following Henley et al. (2009), who suggests that in the absence of information
regarding formality status based on contracts, one should use information concerning
social security contributions as the prime alternative, we use social security contribu-
tions as the main indicator for formality and subsequently use the terms (in)formal
sector, (in)formal workers and informally employed interchangeably. Additionally,
those people receiving medical care and retirement beneﬁts from their employer are
considered formal, as well as those, who claim that their employers withhold taxes
from their income. Besides, those who claim to have a formal private sector job and
for whom the preceding information is missing are considered formal. All remain-
ing are classiﬁed as informal, under the assumption that those individuals, who are
formal would have answered to be identiﬁed as such through any of the preceding
questions. As Figure (3) shows, of the individuals working in the non-public and
non-subsistence argiculture sector around 20% are formal with no clear trend over
time in any country.
Identifying formality status allows the calculation of a net real annual wage for
the formal and informal sector. For all those, who report that net income has already
been deducted, the reported income is considered the net income. In other formal
sector cases, the reported wage is adjusted by the appropriate tax rate.
To test for heterogeneity in descriptive outcomes and to be able control for de-
mographic characteristics when estimating the elasticity of formal work, this study
further restricts the sample to only those observations for which information regard-
ing age, gender, region, relationship to household head, marital status and occupa-
tion exist. These are characteristics previously shown to moderate the probability to
16Ghana 14%, Rwanda 4%, Tanzania 9% and Uganda 22%
17Income data from Tanzania ILFS 2006 does not distinguish between main and secondary job
income. In this case, the sum of income from both main and secondary job is therefore used in
both waves, but the formality status of the main job.
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work in the formal sector.18 Individuals are furthermore grouped according toedu-
cational achievement and diﬀerent parts of the analysis use each two diﬀerent levels
of aggregation of educationals categatories. For the descriptive analysis one measure
distinguishes between four categories of completed educational levels (no or less than
primary education, primary education, junior secondary education, senior secondary
and above), whereas the second splits the last category into senior secondary and
post-secondary/tertiary education, thus consisting of ﬁve categories. For the regres-
sion analysis the ﬁrst two categories (less than primary and primary) are combined.
As respondents have no incentive to not report their educational level and are likely
remembering the achievement of a particular level if completed, individuals, who do
not report their education level are assumed to have no or less than primary educa-
tion. Further, the analysis restricts itself to ﬁve age groups between 15 and 60 years,
considering the compulsory education, legal minimum working and retirement age,
but uses open ended age ranges for robustness checks.
Summary statistics, presented in Table 1, show the aggregated distribution of
individuals across sectors, occupations, age groups and other demographic charac-
teristics, as well as how these individuals divide over the formal and informal sector.
In all countries the quasi-public sector consisting of state-owned enterprises, NGOs
and international organizations, represents at most 6% of employment and is thus
a rather small sector. Around 70% of individuals gain their main income from self-
employment or working in their family business and around 30% through private
sector salaries employment. Only in Uganda the latter two shares are slightly more
balanced. In terms of occupations, the large majority of people hold sales and shop
worker and elementary jobs and in Ghana and Tanzania also craft and in Rwanda
clerical jobs. As Tables A.1-A.4 show, these patterns are in each country consistent
over time.
For all countries, men, household heads and middle aged individuals (25-44 years)
are more likely to be formal workers. Moreover, the share of individuals working in
the formal sector rises with education. Professionals and Technicians and Associate
Professionals are occupations most likely to be formal whereas Clerks and Sales and
Shop workers are most likely informal. Probit model estimations on the determinants
of the formality status, presented in Table A.10 in the Appendix conﬁrm these aggre-
gate ﬁndings and further suggest that men, household heads, women, employees and
those living in urban areas are more likely to have a formal job. In addition, having
kids increases in all countries but Ghana the likelihood of being a formal worker.
Whereas the distribution of characteristics across individuals and the distribution
18That these factors matter also in our case can be seen from the results of probit regressions on
the determinants of informality in Table A.10 in the Appendix.
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of formality status have, as Tables A.1-A.4 show, been rather stable across waves,
the annual net mean income in the formal sector is not in all waves larger than the
mean income in the informal sector, as it is the case for the aggregate. According the
GLSS 3 survey in Ghana and the IFLS 2006 survey in Tanzania, informal workers
earn in aggregate terms more than formal workers.
Density plots of aggregate formal net income and informal income show very little
diﬀerence in mean income (Figure 4). Neither do density plots by gender (Figure
A.1). In terms of shape of the distributions in Figure 4 one observes mainly two
distinct patterns. The ﬁrst is especially visible for Uganda and the later waves for
Ghana in which the distribution largely overlaps with the exception of a much longer
tail of low informal incomes. The second contains distributions with similar means
but a larger variance of informal incomes, as clearly visible in the tighter distribution
of formal income around its mean in the case of Tanzania and the ﬁrst round of
Ghana. A decomposition of mean annual income by urban/rural status, employment
type, or occupation in Table 2 shows that in aggregate terms the formal sector
incomes are generally higher, but there are some exceptions where the reverse holds
and there is a lot of heterogeneity between the speciﬁc groups without a clear pattern
across countries of which sector pays more in a particular subgroup. This ﬁnding
links to the debate in the literature19 regarding the direction of the pay gap between
these two sectors and is in line with ﬁndings by Badaoui et al. (2008) from South
Africa, suggesting that the formal sector wage premium disappears when comparing
net formal wage with informal wages. The fact that we ﬁnd higher informal than
formal mean wages for some sub-group samples, such as Ghana 1991 and Tanzania
2006 and potentially when disaggregating by gender as in Figure A.1, is not all too
surprising and supported by recent ﬁndings from Brazil. These show that for the
ﬁrst quarter of 2014 the mean informal income exceeded formal income for women
aged 25-55 Matos and Portela Souza (2016). This is further supported by ﬁndings
that controlling for other characteristics. Matos and Portela Souza (2016) observe
an overall signiﬁcant reduction in the wage premium of working in the formal sector
between 2002 and 2014 from about 10%(9%) to only 5%(3%) for men and women,
respectively. Based on previous research's ﬁndings one should not necessarily expect
a net pay premium in the formal sector nor an increase in the premium over time as
a country develops. Therefore, the observed distributions do not challenge previous
evidence.
.
Figure A2 provides information about the actual tax rate variation that formal
sector workers have encountered. For this chart, wages from earlier rounds have been
19For more references on this debate see Badaoui et al. (2008).
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uprated into the latest survey year level using an index based on mean wage growth.
The graph shows that, for the case of Ghana, there is quite substantial variation in
the average tax rate in the cell-level data across the income distribution. Since there
has been little variation in the marginal tax rates, these changes mainly occur due
to bracket creep (or ﬁscal drag), i.e. that tax schedules have not been adjusted in
a one-to-one relation with wage growth.
5 Results
Main Results
Table 3 presents the elasticity of formal work for each country, based on the re-
gression results using the grouped estimator and the two variations of educational
categories, discussed in section 3. The ﬁrst column shows the cross-sectional corre-
lation, whereas the second includes the full set of indicator variables. The results for
Ghana and Uganda suggest that the elasticity would be close to zero. This means
that there is no robust evidence that a rise in the net wage diﬀerence between formal
and informal sector, through tax cuts, leads to rise in the share of formal workers,
as theory and ﬁndings by Fernandez and Villar (2017), Kugler et al. (2017) and
Morales and Medina (2017) for a tax cut in Colombia suggest. More in line with
the theory, in Tanzania the mean probability to formalize rises by nearly 0.5% when
the wage premium of working the formal sector increases by 1%. However, this rela-
tionship becomes statistically insigniﬁcant when controlling for other characteristics
and time. Hence, this may be a result of heterogeneous sensitivity of various demo-
graphic groups. In Rwanda on the other hand, the results provide limited evidence
for the opposite relationship. In aggregate terms and when considering the detailed
educational categories the probability to formalize decreases when the income diﬀer-
ence rises, but when controlling for other characteristics and using more aggregate
educational categories the probability to formalize increases with an increasing pay
premium. All results are, as Table A.4 in the Appendix displays, while not in levels
but nevertheless in terms of signiﬁcance robust to using either aggregated or disag-
gregated educational categories in an open ended age range and restricting the age
further to only those above 25 years.20 The results are moreover robust to increasing
the minimum cell size per group from 10 to at least 25 observations.
20At age 25 the majority of individuals is assumed to have ﬁnalized their formal education. This
avoids bias from a certain highly educated group of individuals more likely to me formal not being
accounted for.
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Heterogeneity Tests
Given the gender diﬀerence in the observed aggregate wage premium for work-
ing in the formal versus informal sector, observed in the literature by Matos and
Portela Souza (2016) for Brazil and visible in varying sectoral density plots of income
by gender in Figure A.1, as well as gender being, as Table A.X shows, a signiﬁcant
factor determining informality, there is reason to expect that the
elasticity to work in the formal sector could also vary by gender. Moreover,
restricting the sample to those individuals earning an above minimum wage reduces
potential biases from extremely low informal wages. The estimations, presented in
Table 4, restrict the model to those individuals earning more than the minimum
wage, whereby columns (2) and (3) further restrict the model to only male and
female observations, respectively. These ﬁndings largely resemble those in Table
1. Columns (3) in panel b) of Table 3, however, provide evidence for a positive
signiﬁcant elasticity of formal work for Rwandan women. This result is in line with
ﬁndings by Kugler et al. (2017), who similarly ﬁnd in Colombia a larger signiﬁcant
probability to formalize for women than for men at the lower income end. At the
same time panel c) of the same table provides some evidence for a negative elasticity
of formal work for male Tanzanians. However, these results are only indicative. Not
only the number of grouped observations21 are smaller due to an insuﬃcient number
of observations falling into a particular group22, but also the within group cell size
is smaller and thus less representative. This is particularly the case when splitting
the sample into half, when distinguishing between varying elasticities for men and
women.
In addition to these, several alternative speciﬁcations are estimated: Firstly, the
same model and its variations is estimated restricting the sample only to individuals
working as salaried employees in the private or quasi-public sector. A second alter-
native aggregates the intermediate age groups and occupation types and additionally
groups by urban/rural status and uses the more aggregated educational categoriza-
tion. Whereas this introduces more variation in terms of group observations the cell
size of each group is even smaller. To increase cell size, the third alternative does not
group by educational category. Therefore the third alternative follows the second al-
ternative speciﬁcation, but does not group by educational category and instead adds
controls for the share of married individuals, household heads and individuals with
kids in each respective group. The results of these three alternative speciﬁcations
21If there were suﬃcient observations for each group the group N for Ghana in the disaggregated
educational category case and age 15-60 model should, for instance, be 4 survey waves*2 gender*5
age groups*4 educational categories=160 groups and thus 80 groups for men and 80 for women.
22It is less likely to reach the minimum cell size of 10 observations.
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are largely consistent with those of the main model and do not alter the previous
results in terms of signiﬁcance levels (see Tables A.7-9).
Apart from the grouped estimations, we also estimate individual level regressions
based on imputed income as discussed in the last paragraph of section 2 (Methodol-
ogy). In this way we can obtain an F-statistics for the excluded elements presented
in Table 5. While the F-statistic for Ghana and Rwanda is much lower, than in the
other countries, this is not of concern as the p-values for all these are very close to
zero and thus highly signiﬁcant. The low F-statistic may rather be a result of the
larger number of interactions. There is thus signiﬁcant evidence for the validity of
the group*time interactions as instruments in the ﬁrst stage.
Overall Discussion and Limitations
Taken together the ﬁndings suggest that changes in the formal  informal wage gap
have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability to be a formal worker for the population
as a whole. There are however some exceptions: When controlling for other char-
acteristics the probability for Rwandan women to work formally rise, whereas this
probability decreases for Tanzanian men. The signiﬁcant results for particular demo-
graphic groups suggest that country-speciﬁc tax and beneﬁt systems might play an
important role in incentivizing diﬀerent demographic groups to formalize. No robust
positive signiﬁcant evidence and the absence of robust negative signiﬁcant evidence
for all other cases means that changes in the tax rate and resulting changes in the
sectoral wage diﬀerential do not signiﬁcantly change the probability to have a formal
job. This result is supported by the density plots, presented in the section on Data
and Descriptive statistics, which display largely overlapping distributions and only
very minor diﬀerences between the locations of the mean of the distributions. While
tax treatment of inviduals had variation, it mainly stemmed from bracket creep,
which workers may not necessarily notice. Moreover, some g tax rate changes, espe-
cially in Ghana and Uganda, occurred mostly at tax bracket kinks that far exceed
the income of the mean respondent, as the vertical lines in Figure 4 indicate 23
Besides, the lack of sensitivity may be a result of a lack of advantages or little
awareness concerning the advantages of a formal job apart from potentially a minimal
wage premium. This would be in line with ﬁndings by Bargain and Kwenda (2011)
that the formal sector wage premium is higher in South Africa due to larger legal
beneﬁts of a formal job than in Mexico and Brazil with fewer beneﬁts from formal
23For Ghana and Uganda the green vertical lines indicating tax bracket kinks with tax rate
changes lie at the right tail of the income distribution and therefore only aﬀect a very small pro-
portion of the respondents.
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jobs.
Besides, the ﬁndings might be attributed to a lack of knowledge and capacity,
related to low levels of education, on how to formalize or imagined or actual bureau-
cratic costs of formalizing not outweighing the minimal pay diﬀerential. This view is,
however, challenged by McKenzie and Sakho (2010)'s ﬁndings from Bolivia, where
among large ﬁrms it is mainly high-ability entrepreneurs who stay informal and for-
malizing is not beneﬁcial in terms of ﬁrm proﬁts over all ﬁrm sizes. Alternatively,
land ownership issues have been found to be important hindrances to formalizing
business even when building capacity and eliminating formalization costs, as in the
ﬁeld experiment by De Mel et al. (2013) in Sri Lanka. These issues may also play
a role in African countries. Apart from these potential explanations for our ﬁnd-
ings, there are several aspects directly related to the study design that should be
considered when interpreting the results. The number of survey waves and the time
frame they span varies accross countries.This is especially a concern for countries,
such as Tanzania, with just two survey waves and Uganda with four survey waves
but conducted in consecutive years. Also survey sample sizes vary by country and
survey wave and sample sizes (i.e. at least 10 observations per group cell, or 25 in
robustness checks, with no formal/ informal proportional requirement within the at
least 10 (25) observations per group cells) may not be large enough to capture the
mean wage premium of working in the formal sector of the respective group. Finally,
as stated earlier, income data in developing countries is very noisy24. Hence, this
will make it by default diﬃcult to ﬁnd robust evidence for minimal changes in the
formality rate. Nevertheless, this study gives some ﬁrst and currently best possi-
ble indicative cross-country evidence on the relative (in)elasticity of formal work in
sub-Saharan Africa.
6 Conclusion
In need of raising domestic revenues, developing countries are challenged by partly
missing the underlying precondition to collect taxes, namely the existence of a tax
base, due to the persistently large informal sector. A key policy question is there-
fore the elasticity of formal work, meaning to what extent increases in the tax rate
incentivise people to move from a formal job into informal employment to avoid
the tax burden, or a decrease in the tax rate may make working in a formal job
24For this reasons many studies and surveys in particular in Africa with large shares of the pop-
ulation living on subsistence farming, use household budget questions, consumption or expenditure
to proxy for income
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more attractive and induce informal workers to formalize. While there is evidence
for an eﬀect of tax rate changes on intensive margin labour supply for developed
countries and there is some evidence from Latin America that tax reductions may
increase the incentives for individuals to work in the formal sector, evidence from
developing countries in other parts of the world, in particular from African coun-
tries, characterized by an even larger informal sector, is still missing. Individuals in
African countries may however react very diﬀerent to tax rate changes, due to their
less developed beneﬁt and tax systems. This paper therefore sought to investigate
this question for four countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana, Rwanda, Tanzania
and Uganda. Household survey data over a period from 1999 until 2014 is used to
construct pseudo panels, consisting of two to four survey waves for each country. By
applying grouping estimator techniques, this study subsequently estimates the eﬀect
of anexogenously induced change in the mean wage diﬀerence between the formal
and informal sector, on the probability to work in the formal sector..
The focus is thereby on private and quasi-public sector worker for whom the
choice to become (in)formal may be an option. Public sector workers and subsistence
agricultural workers are excluded from the analysis, as these are by default consid-
ered formal and informal, respectively. For all other workers formality is determined
based on tax payments and, if unavailable, based on social security contributions
or beneﬁts in terms of health care and pension plans or otherwise individual's self-
reported formality status, which comes close to one of the, according to Henley et al.
(2009), three main classiﬁcation strategies identiﬁed in the literature. Other often
used strategies to deﬁne formality have been the contract status or the sector of
employment, distinguishing between salaried and self-employed workers. Informa-
tion on the former is not available for all countries and the latter is considered not
suﬃciently comprehensive given the large share of non-tax paying salaried private
sector workers.
In investigating the question of the tax rate sensitivity of formal work, this study
faces a signiﬁcant challenge concerning the quality of the available data on household
incomes. However, even if imprecise, results based on these data give the currently
the best possible estimates, as this is the only available data. Descriptive analysis
shows a signiﬁcant overlap between earnings in the non-public formal and informal
sector, though with greater heterogeneity in the latter in almost all cases. The
regression analysis, based on the expected diﬀerential between earnings in formal
and informal work, shows no impact of this diﬀerential on the probability of being a
formal worker.
While this issue still requires further research, diﬀerent explanations for the ﬁnd-
ing of largely non-elastic formality status can be considered. The low wage diﬀerential
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between the formal and informal sector in all four countries is likely to be a major
factor. In addition, there is likely to be a limited availability of formal sector jobs,
and especially so for those living in rural areas and those without or only low edu-
cational qualiﬁcations. Besides, workers currently in the informal sector, who might
have the skills needed for formal jobs, may not be well informed about such vacan-
cies and advantages of formal sector jobs. Moreover, there might be a general lack of
information regarding the functioning of the tax system, tax rate changes and how
to formalize in practice, which is relevant for the self-employed. Considering that
the likelihood to work informally showed to be higher for those with lower education,
there may be a general lack of capacity to formalize. Workers may also have, irre-
spective of the wage diﬀerential between the two sectors, other reasons for preferring
to work in the informal sector, such as the proximity or ﬂexibility of the informal job,
or the perceived beneﬁts of the formal sector not outweighing the perceived costs of
paying taxes and the bureaucracy involved in formalizing. Furthermore, the country-
speciﬁc design of the taxation system could have important eﬀects on the elasticity
of formal work due to diﬀering incentives to formalize as a result of varying beneﬁts
that can be obtained from formalizing in diﬀerent countries by diﬀerent demographic
groups. Lastly, the tax rate changes during the sample period and the bracket creep,
caused by inﬂation adjusted wages falling into diﬀerent tax brackets, may not have
resulted in suﬃcient variation in the sectoral wage gap to initiate notable response
While there are obviously reasons to be cautious in interpreting the results, as
income data in least developed countries is widely known to be noisy, the evidence
this study gathered, which is robust to a variety of speciﬁcations, is not consistent
with the notion of the existence of a severe trade oﬀ between the share of formal work
and taxation.This study adds to the literature in terms of external validity regarding
tax induced extensive margin labour supply decisionsin developing countries.
The ﬁndings of this study have two important policy implications: First, it may
be that raising tax rates mildly does not necessarily lead to a greater share of the
informal sector. Second, the ﬁndings relate to Chetty et al. (2009)'s argument that
in order to observe behavioural sensitivity to policy changes, such as changes in
the tax rate, those policies need to be salient. Capacity building and information
dissemination campaigns, targeted especially at the lower educated, rural population,
and women, on the beneﬁts of formal work, the practicalities of how to formalize
and the working of the tax system, and addressing potential hindrances, such as
land titles, may be policy tools that could help making the issue salient and result
in enlarging the tax base in terms of individuals.
18
References
Albrecht, J., Navarro, L., and Vroman, S. (2009). The eﬀects of labour market policies
in an economy with an informal sector. The Economic Journal, 119(539):1105
1129.
Alonso-Ortiz, J. and Leal, J. (2013). The elasticity of informality to taxes and trans-
fers. Working Paper 13-08, Centro de Investigación Económica, ITAM, Mexico
City, Mexico.
Alzúa, M. L., Cruces, G., and Ripani, L. (2012). Welfare programs and labor supply
in developing countries: experimental evidence from Latin America. Journal of
Population Economics, 26(4):12551284.
Angrist, J. and Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiri-
cist's Companion. Princeton University Press.
Antón, A. (2014). The eﬀect of payroll taxes on employment and wages under high
labor informality. IZA Journal of Labor & Development, 3(1).
Auriol, E. and Warlters, M. (2012). The marginal cost of public funds and tax reform
in Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 97(1):58  72.
Badaoui, E. E., Strobl, E., and Walsh, F. (2008). Is there an informal employment
wage penalty? evidence from South Africa. Economic Development and Cultural
Change, 56(3):683710.
Bargain, O. and Kwenda, P. (2010). Is informality bad? evidence from brazil, mexico
and south africa. IZA Discussion Paper Series, IZA DP No. 4711.
Bargain, O. and Kwenda, P. (2011). Earnings structures, informal employment, and
self-employment: New evidence from Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa. Review of
Income and Wealth, 57:S100S122.
Benhassine, N., McKenzie, D., Pouliquen, V., and Santini, M. (2018). Does inducing
informal ﬁrms to formalize make sense? experimental evidence from benin. Journal
of Public Economics, 157:114.
Bergolo, M. and Cruces, G. (2014a). The anatomy of behavioral responses to social
assistance when informal employment is high. Discussion Paper 8198, IZA.
19
Bergolo, M. and Cruces, G. (2014b). Work and tax evasion incentive eﬀects of
social insurance programs: Evidence from an employment-based beneﬁt extension.
Journal of Public Economics, 117:211  228.
Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2013). Chapter 2 - taxation and development. In Auer-
bach, A. J., Chetty, R., Feldstein, M., and Saez, E., editors, Handbook of Public
Economics, vol. 5, volume 5 of Handbook of Public Economics, pages 51  110.
Elsevier.
Bhorat, H., Kanbur, R., and Stanwix, B. (2014). Estimating the impact of minimum
wages on employment, wages, and non-wage beneﬁts: The case of agriculture in
south africa. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 96(5):14021419.
Blundell, R., Duncan, A., and Meghir, C. (1998). Estimating labor supply responses
using tax reforms. Econometrica, 66(4):827861.
Bosch, M. and Campos-Vazquez, R. M. (2014). The trade-oﬀs of welfare policies in
labor markets with informal jobs: The case of the "Seguro Popular" program in
Mexico. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(4):7199.
Bosch, M. and Esteban-Pretel, J. (2013). The labor market eﬀects of introducing
unemployment beneﬁts in an economy with high informality. Working Paper 402,
IAD.
Bruhn, M. and McKenzie, D. (2013). Using administrative data to evaluate mu-
nicipal reforms: an evaluation of the impact of minas fácil expresso. Journal of
Development Eﬀectiveness, 5(3):319338.
Bruhn, M. and McKenzie, D. (2014). Entry regulation and the formalization of
microenterprises in developing countries. The World Bank Research Observer,
29(2):186201.
Charmes, J. (2012). The informal economy worldwide: Trends and characteristics.
Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research, 6(2):103132.
Chetty, R., Looney, A., and Kroft, K. (2009). Salience and taxation: Theory and
evidence. American economic review, 99(4):114577.
De Mel, S., McKenzie, D., and Woodruﬀ, C. (2013). The demand for, and conse-
quences of, formalization among informal ﬁrms in sri lanka. American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 5(2):12250.
20
Deaton, A. (1985). Panel data from time series of cross-sections. Journal of Econo-
metrics, 30(1):109  126.
Feltenstein, A. and Shamloo, M. (2013). Tax reform, the informal economy, and bank
ﬁnancing of capital formation. International Tax and Public Finance, 20(1):128.
Fernandez, C. and Villar, L. (2017). The impact of lowering the payroll tax on
informality in Colombia. Economía, 18(1):125155.
Fields, G. S. (1975). Rural-urban migration, urban unemployment and underem-
ployment, and job-search activity in LDCs. Journal of Development Economics,
2(2):165  187.
Garganta, S. and Gasparini, L. (2015). The impact of a social program on labor
informality: The case of AUH in argentina. Journal of Development Economics,
115:99  110.
Gorodnichenko, Y., Martinez-Vazquez, J., and Peter, K. S. (2009). Myth and reality
of ﬂat tax reform: Micro estimates of tax evasion response and welfare eﬀects in
Russia. Journal of Political Economy, 117(3):504554.
Henley, A., Arabsheibani, G. R., and Carneiro, F. G. (2009). On deﬁning and mea-
suring the informal sector: Evidence from Brazil. World Development, 37(5):992
 1003.
Jacquet, L., Lehmann, E., and der Linden, B. V. (2013). Optimal redistributive
taxation with both extensive and intensive responses. Journal of Economic Theory,
148(5):1770  1805.
Jäntti, M., Pirttilä, J., and Selin, H. (2015). Estimating labour supply elasticities
based on cross-country micro data: A bridge between micro and macro elasticities?
Journal of Public Economics. forthcoming.
Kugler, A. and Kugler, M. (2009). Labor market eﬀects of payroll taxes in developing
countries: Evidence from Colombia. Economic Development and Cultural Change,
57(2):335358.
Kugler, A. D., Kugler, M. D., and Herrera-Prada, L. O. (2017). Do payroll tax breaks
stimulate formality?: Evidence from colombia's reform. Economía, 18(1):340.
Lora, E. and Fajardo-González, J. (2016). Employment and taxes in Latin America:
An empirical study of the eﬀects of payroll, corporate income and value added
taxes on labor outcomes. Cuadernos de Economía, 35(67):75117.
21
Maloney, W. F. (1999). Does informality imply segmentation in urban labor markets?
evidence from sectoral transitions in mexico. The World Bank Economic Review,
13(2):275302.
Maloney, W. F. (2004). Informality revisited. World development, 32(7):11591178.
Matos, V. and Portela Souza, A. (2016). Mudancas dos diﬀerenciais de salários
formal e informal: reducão da segmentacão ou do salário hedônico? In Holanda
Barbosa Filo, d. F., Ulyssea, G., and Veloso, F., editors, Causas e Consequências
da Informalidade No Brasil, chapter 2. Elsevier.
McKenzie, D. and Sakho, Y. S. (2010). Does it pay ﬁrms to register for taxes?
the impact of formality on ﬁrm proﬁtability. Journal of Development Economics,
91(1):1524.
Morales, L. and Medina, C. (2017). Assessing the eﬀect of payroll taxes on formal
employment: the case of the 2012 tax reform in Colombia. Economía, 18(1):75
124.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2013). Chapter 7 - optimal labor income taxation. In
Auerbach, A. J., Chetty, R., Feldstein, M., and Saez, E., editors, Handbook of
Public Economics, vol. 5, volume 5 of Handbook of Public Economics, pages 391 
474. Elsevier.
Tondini, A., Ardington, C., and Woolard, I. (2017). Public pensions and elderly
informal employment: Evidence from a change in retirement age in South Africa.
Working Paper 05, SALDRU.
Zarkovi¢-Raki¢, J., Ranelovi¢, S., and Vladisavljevi¢, M. (2016). Labour market ef-
fects of social security contributions reform in Serbia. Economic Annals, LXI(208).
22
Figures
Source: Authors' own calculations based on UNU-WIDER-ICTD Government Rev-
enue Dataset.
Figure 1: Tax revenues including social security contributions (SSC) as a percentage
of GDP in selected African countries.
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Source: Authors' own calculations based on UNU-WIDER-ICTD Government Rev-
enue Dataset.
Figure 2: Labour income tax and social security contributions (SSC) receipts as a
percentage of GDP in selected African countries.
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Source: Authors' own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3,
IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010  2013/2014.
Figure 3: Share of Formal Workers by Country.
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Figure 4: Distribution of aggregate Formal vs Informal Income by Country and Survey Wave 
 
a) Ghana 1991 b) Ghana 1998 c) Ghana 2005/06 d) Ghana 2012 
    
e) Rwanda 2000 f) Rwanda 2005 g) Rwanda 2011  
   
 
h) Tanzania 2006 i) Tanzania 2014   
  
  
j) Uganda 2009/10 k) Uganda 2010/11 l) Uganda 2011/12 m) Uganda 2013/14 
    
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 
2009/2010 – 2013/2014 
Note: The black vertical line indicates the minimum wage level and the red and green lines indicate the tax bracket 
kinks, whereby the green ones show some variation in tax rate over time whereas red once do not. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Country (as aggregate over survey waves) 
 
Ghana Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
 Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total 
Quasi-Public 
0.00319 0.0335 0.0118 0.0114 0.111 0.0215 0.0140 0.133 0.0327 0.0325 0.185 0.0599 
(0.0564) (0.180) (0.108) (0.106) (0.314) (0.145) (0.118) (0.340) (0.178) (0.177) (0.389) (0.237) 
Private Employee 
0.245 0.495 0.315 0.193 0.499 0.224 0.203 0.584 0.262 0.501 0.697 0.536 
(0.430) (0.500) (0.465) (0.395) (0.5) (0.417) (0.402) (0.493) (0.440) (0.500) (0.460) (0.499) 
Self Employed/Employer 
0.675 0.412 0.601 0.0816 0.108 0.0842 0.551 0.227 0.500 0.00162 0.00595 0.00240 
(0.468) (0.492) (0.490) (0.274) (0.31) (0.278) (0.497) (0.419) (0.500) (0.0403) (0.0770) (0.0489) 
Family Business/Home 
0.0352 0.0383 0.0361 0.709 0.282 0.665 0.232 0.0547 0.204 0.465 0.112 0.402 
(0.184) (0.192) (0.186) (0.454) (0.45) (0.472) (0.422) (0.227) (0.403) (0.499) (0.315) (0.490) 
Other Work 
0.0416 0.0210 0.0358 0.00555 0.000695 0.00506 0.0000676 0 0.0000571 0 0 0 
(0.200) (0.143) (0.186) (0.0743) (0.0264) (0.071) (0.00822) (0) (0.00755) (0) (0) (0) 
Armed Forces 
0.00149 0.0101 0.00392 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000501 0.00368 0.00107 
(0.0386) (0.0998) (0.0625) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.0224) (0.0606) (0.0327) 
Legislator/Manager 
0.0107 0.0277 0.0155 0.0119 0.142 0.0251 0.00235 0.0277 0.00631 0.00382 0.0297 0.00846 
(0.103) (0.164) (0.124) (0.109) (0.349) (0.156) (0.0484) (0.164) (0.0792) (0.0617) (0.170) (0.0916) 
Professional 
0.0173 0.0886 0.0375 0.00494 0.0762 0.0122 0.00332 0.0578 0.0118 0.0345 0.230 0.0695 
(0.130) (0.284) (0.190) (0.0701) (0.265) (0.11) (0.0575) (0.233) (0.108) (0.183) (0.421) (0.254) 
Technician/Associate Professional 
0.0170 0.0506 0.0265 0.00588 0.0988 0.0153 0.0123 0.0549 0.0190 0.0652 0.195 0.0883 
(0.129) (0.219) (0.161) (0.0765) (0.298) (0.123) (0.110) (0.228) (0.136) (0.247) (0.396) (0.284) 
Clerk 
0.00899 0.0462 0.0195 0.104 0.0893 0.102 0.00511 0.0603 0.0137 0.00774 0.0424 0.0139 
(0.0944) (0.210) (0.138) (0.305) (0.285) (0.303) (0.0713) (0.238) (0.116) (0.0876) (0.202) (0.117) 
Service/Sales Workers 
0.413 0.339 0.392 0.0889 0.243 0.105 0.279 0.283 0.280 0.166 0.0915 0.153 
(0.492) (0.473) (0.488) (0.285) (0.429) (0.306) (0.449) (0.451) (0.449) (0.372) (0.289) (0.360) 
Agricultural Workers 
0.0485 0.0183 0.0400 0.577 0.207 0.539 0.238 0.0837 0.213 0.0932 0.0429 0.0842 
(0.215) (0.134) (0.196) (0.494) (0.405) (0.498) (0.426) (0.277) (0.410) (0.291) (0.203) (0.278) 
Craft/related Trades 
0.284 0.191 0.257 0.0423 0.03 0.0411 0.175 0.129 0.168 0.0951 0.0271 0.0829 
(0.451) (0.393) (0.437) (0.201) (0.171) (0.199) (0.380) (0.335) (0.374) (0.293) (0.163) (0.276) 
Plant/Machine Operators/Assemblers 
0.0751 0.121 0.0880 0.0213 0.0305 0.0223 0.0432 0.180 0.0646 0.0340 0.0733 0.0410 
(0.264) (0.326) (0.283) (0.145) (0.172) (0.148) (0.203) (0.384) (0.246) (0.181) (0.261) (0.198) 
Elementary Occupation 
0.124 0.108 0.119 0.144 0.0832 0.138 0.242 0.124 0.223 0.500 0.265 0.458 
(0.330) (0.310) (0.324) (0.351) (0.276) (0.345) (0.428) (0.330) (0.417) (0.500) (0.442) (0.498) 
Primary or Less 
0.439 0.238 0.382 0.897 0.453 0.852 0.885 0.602 0.841 0.702 0.350 0.639 
(0.496) (0.426) (0.486) (0.304) (0.498) (0.355) (0.319) (0.490) (0.366) (0.458) (0.477) (0.480) 
Lower Secondary 
0.416 0.416 0.416 0.0239 0.0647 0.028 0.102 0.255 0.126 0.184 0.248 0.195 
(0.493) (0.493) (0.493) (0.153) (0.246) (0.165) (0.302) (0.436) (0.332) (0.387) (0.433) (0.397) 
Upper Secondary 
0.128 0.233 0.158 0.045 0.313 0.0722 0.0117 0.0831 0.0228 0.0459 0.0766 0.0514 
(0.335) (0.423) (0.365) (0.207) (0.464) (0.259) (0.107) (0.276) (0.149) (0.209) (0.266) (0.221) 
Tertiary/Post-Secondary 
0.0160 0.113 0.0434 0.00572 0.131 0.0184 0.00178 0.0596 0.0108 0.0685 0.326 0.114 
(0.126) (0.316) (0.204) (0.0754) (0.338) (0.135) (0.0421) (0.237) (0.103) (0.253) (0.469) (0.318) 
Age 15-24 
0.159 0.104 0.144 0.295 0.258 0.291 0.209 0.138 0.198 0.383 0.175 0.346 
(0.366) (0.306) (0.351) (0.456) (0.438) (0.454) (0.407) (0.345) (0.398) (0.486) (0.380) (0.476) 
Age 25-34 
0.346 0.347 0.346 0.326 0.361 0.329 0.351 0.367 0.353 0.317 0.408 0.333 
(0.476) (0.476) (0.476) (0.469) (0.48) (0.47) (0.477) (0.482) (0.478) (0.465) (0.492) (0.471) 
Age 35-44 
0.275 0.302 0.283 0.196 0.231 0.199 0.263 0.288 0.267 0.185 0.310 0.207 
(0.447) (0.459) (0.450) (0.397) (0.422) (0.4) (0.440) (0.453) (0.443) (0.388) (0.463) (0.405) 
Age 45-54 
0.168 0.188 0.174 0.137 0.124 0.136 0.130 0.169 0.136 0.0868 0.0835 0.0862 
(0.374) (0.391) (0.379) (0.344) (0.329) (0.342) (0.336) (0.375) (0.343) (0.282) (0.277) (0.281) 
Age 55-60 
0.0516 0.0586 0.0535 0.0466 0.0255 0.0445 0.0472 0.0386 0.0459 0.0289 0.0245 0.0281 
(0.221) (0.235) (0.225) (0.211) (0.158) (0.206) (0.212) (0.193) (0.209) (0.168) (0.155) (0.165) 
Household Head 
0.523 0.636 0.555 0.519 0.534 0.521 0.554 0.717 0.579 0.472 0.580 0.492 
(0.499) (0.481) (0.497) (0.5) (0.499) (0.5) (0.497) (0.451) (0.494) (0.499) (0.494) (0.500) 
non-Household Head 
0.477 0.364 0.445 0.481 0.466 0.479 0.446 0.283 0.421 0.528 0.420 0.508 
(0.499) (0.481) (0.497) (0.5) (0.499 (0.5) (0.497) (0.451) (0.494) (0.499) (0.494) (0.500) 
Male 
0.399 0.568 0.447 0.59 0.659 0.597 0.561 0.747 0.590 0.708 0.580 0.685 
(0.490) (0.495) (0.497) (0.492) (0.474 (0.491) (0.496) (0.435) (0.492) (0.455) (0.494) (0.465) 
Female 
0.601 0.432 0.553 0.41 0.341 0.403 0.439 0.253 0.410 0.292 0.420 0.315 
(0.490) (0.495) (0.497) (0.492) (0.474 (0.491) (0.496) (0.435) (0.492) (0.455) (0.494) (0.465) 
Household size 
4.588 4.246 4.491 5.294 6.056 5.371 4.826 4.711 4.808 6.491 5.968 6.397 
(2.825) (2.462) (2.731) (2.316) (2.641) (2.362) (2.728) (3.168) (2.801) (4.200) (3.645) (4.110) 
Mean share of married individuals 
0.524 0.579 0.540 0.394 0.427 0.397 0.259 0.254 0.259 0.416 0.481 0.428 
(0.499) (0.494) (0.498) (0.489) (0.495) (0.489) (0.438) (0.436) (0.438) (0.493) (0.500) (0.495) 
Mean share of individuals with kids in hh 
0.0124 0.00450 0.0102 0.0515 0.0737 0.0538 0.0300 0.00331 0.0259 0.0643 0.0100 0.0546 
(0.111) (0.0670) (0.101) (0.221) (0.261) (0.226) (0.171) (0.0574) (0.159) (0.245) (0.0998) (0.227) 
Observations 21043     22819 
  
19260     3003     
 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014 
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Table 2: Decomposition of Mean Annual Income by Formality Status and Country (as aggregate over survey waves) 
  Ghana Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Mean Annual New Income Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total 
all 
3257.7 4481.4 3601.6 536303.7 1033203.9 586595.0 3820186.8 4193190.2 3878511.2 3221518.8 5073075.7 3552123.7 
(5691.3) (7638.2) (6323.2) (1767232.1) (2187826.1) (1820366.0) (8550755.3) (5478103.8) (8148115.0) (5424904.5) (7473913.1) (5885040.4) 
rural 
3532.0 4603.9 3945.9 1159394.0 1285196.4 1188241.3 4628706.6 4540184.3 4611070.4 4054750.7 6225968.5 4552647.6 
(5347.0) (8139.1) (6587.0) (2850160.7) (2360002.5) (2745832.5) (9463277.2) (5843781.0) (8860812.0) (6380375.4) (8828286.9) (7073255.4) 
urban 
3169.9 4402.9 3464.9 377107.6 740118.0 399378.2 2658218.7 2875467.6 2676913.7 2700929.1 3791747.6 2857243.7 
(5794.8) (7300.0) (6210.4) (1312023.6) (1928805.5) (1360655.0) (6871361.9) (3484296.8) (6648015.8) (4658032.7) (5328415.4) (4772994.8) 
Employees 
3432.0 4330.2 3610.1 500322.2 1282684.3 541253.5 4244941.0 4737108.9 4275737.7 2337733.3 3187525.8 2381932.8 
(6115.5) (8143.6) (6576.8) (1776551.5) (2853807.5) (1856607.9) (9400332.3) (6449596.1) (9243950.2) (3327311.8) (5513546.7) (3476988.9) 
Self-Employed/Employer 
2727.7 4618.8 3583.9 676447.4 873635.9 726059.4 2285593.0 3979490.1 2929868.9 3996129.5 5325088.2 4347765.0 
(4098.7) (7147.0) (5761.9) (1723531.3) (1605606.2) (1696651.2) (3875412.7) (5031081.7) (4427994.7) (6652480.2) (7667623.3) (6957933.3) 
high-skilled occupations 
4649.1 7388.6 6275.9 1927820.2 1645105.0 1755184.0 8319792.0 8873330.1 8647016.2 5137078.3 7630184.6 6356651.8 
(7196.2) (12367.5) (10658.8) (4559500.4) (3061136.6) (3717755.7) (18208605.4) (9120746.1) (13584922.5) (11647035.3) (9829049.5) (10856536.0) 
semi-skilled occupations 
3034.8 3761.2 3210.8 1039008.8 1396612.4 1069109.3 4814144.7 4058603.0 4691217.3 4736168.0 4796215.7 4743884.6 
(4908.5) (5969.0) (5194.0) (2896576.6) (2840835.4) (2893170.5) (9385120.7) (4623774.7) (8791919.0) (3947067.1) (3548801.3) (3892982.5) 
low-skilled occupations 
2778.4 4033.0 3132.0 408690.5 785827.0 426179.1 2139841.3 2919324.1 2234068.0 2677365.9 2222681.2 2624194.1 
(4856.2) (6512.1) (5403.6) (1283997.0) (1174596.7) (1281552.4) (4754299.4) (2889111.5) (4576398.4) (3775894.5) (2512277.5) (3653086.1) 
services & sales occupations 
3551.4 3881.2 3632.0 418811.8 384489.0 410725.6 6032495.8 3706627.3 5664689.6 3145342.6 4447420.3 3284955.2 
(6401.9) (5862.8) (6275.5) (1097801.6) (818781.2) (1038783.1) (11370072.3) (5081618.9) (10659832.9) (4968534.3) (5251828.5) (5010895.6) 
 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014 
Note: All income figures are displayed in real local currency terms (based to 2010 values). As not all survey rounds for Ghana included a urban/rural indicator, the figures presented are for capital and non-capital region instead. The nine standardized occupational 
categories are aggregated as follows: high skilled: (1) Legislators, Managers and Senior Officials, (2) Professionals, (3) Technicians and Associate Professionals; semi-skilled: (4) Clerks, (7) Crafts and related trades workers; low - skilled: (6) skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers, (8) Machine operators and assemblers, (9) Elementary occupations; service and sales workers: (5) service and sales workers. The (0) armed forces category is here excluded.  
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Table 3 : Elasticity of Formal Work - detailed educational categories age 15-60 
  
disaggregated educational categories aggregated educational categories 
  
No controls All controls No controls All controls 
 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
a) Ghana 
Elasticity 0.324 -0.03 0.311 -0.029 
Std. Dev. (0.217) (0.1) (0.225) (0.106) 
Group N 130 130 110 110 
b) Rwanda 
Elasticity -0.629*** 0.342 -0.493** 0.482* 
Std. Dev. (0.229) (0.283) (0.233) (0.255) 
Group N 81 81 68 68 
c) Tanzania 
Elasticity 0.482*** -0.02 0.488*** -0.089 
Std. Dev. (0.17) (0.35) (0.177) (0.368) 
Group N 61 61 53 53 
d) Uganda 
Elasticity 0.218 -0.09 0.3 -0.103 
Std. Dev. (0.219) (0.104) (0.218) (0.096) 
Group N 74 74 78 78 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Column (1) presents the results of a model without controls. The next model (2) includes the full set of demographic 
characteristics and time dummies1. Group N indicates the number of grouped observations.  
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 
2013/2014 
 
Table 4 : Elasticity of Formal Work – above minimum wage by gender age 15-60 
  
disaggregated educational categories aggregated educational categories 
 
  
All 
controls 
All controls 
(men) 
All controls 
(women) 
All 
controls 
All controls 
(men) 
All controls 
(women) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
a) 
Ghana 
Elasticity -0.041 -0.126 0.061 -0.042 -0.214 0.151 
Std. Dev. (0.113) (0.179) (0.136) (0.121) (0.148) (0.151) 
Group N 125 71 54 105 57 48 
b) 
Rwanda 
Elasticity 0.342 -0.194 0.670*** 0.482* 0.031 0.685*** 
Std. Dev. (0.283) (0.308) (0.256) (0.255) (0.341) (0.256) 
Group N 81 46 35 68 37 31 
c) 
Tanzania 
Elasticity -0.02 -0.647** -0.118 -0.089 -0.798** -0.212 
Std. Dev. (0.35) (0.301) (0.427) (0.368) (0.322) (0.457) 
Group N 61 34 27 53 29 24 
d) 
Uganda 
Elasticity -0.09 -0.071 -0.033 -0.103 -0.104 -0.07 
Std. Dev. (0.104) (0.122) (0.196) (0.096) (0.105) (0.187) 
Group N 74 45 29 78 46 32 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models include the full set of demographic characteristics and time dummies2. Group N indicates the number of grouped 
observations.  
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 
2013/2014 
 
Table 5: Individual Level Regression validity test of  group*time interaction as first stage 
  Ghana Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
F-statistic F(109, 18338) =    2.59 F( 68, 22222) =    4.86 F( 35, 19184) =   11.63 F(153,  2794) =   21.04 
P-value Prob > F =    0.0000  Prob > F =    0.0000 Prob > F =    0.0000 Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 
2013/2014 
Note: These estimates are based on a model with a full set of dummies with disaggregated educational categories and 
individuals aged 15-60 
                                                          
1 These are year dummies, except for in Uganda where surveys are split over two years. In this case the year 
dummies are replaced by dummies for each wave. 
2 These are year dummies, except for in Uganda where surveys are split over two years. In this case the year 
dummies are replaced by dummies for each wave. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics – Ghana, by Survey Wave 
 
Ghana_GLSS3 Ghana_GLSS4 Ghana_GLSS5   Ghana_GLSS6 
  Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total 
Annual Net Income 
1520.5 1413.6 1507.3 1551.9 1866.8 1585.0 1453.2 2453.8 1759.8 4550.3 6219.8 4992.9 
(2230.1) (1202.9) (2130.5) (2628.3) (1684.7) (2547.1) (2223.1) (3205.5) (2605.2) (6931.4) (9646.6) (7778.9) 
Quasi-Public 
0.00130 0.265 0.0338 0.00496 0.201 0.0256 0.00171 0.0416 0.0139 0.00425 0.0262 0.0101 
(0.0360) (0.442) (0.181) (0.0703) (0.401) (0.158) (0.0413) (0.200) (0.117) (0.0650) (0.160) (0.0998) 
Private Employee 
0.0805 0.677 0.154 0.100 0.721 0.165 0.247 0.475 0.317 0.244 0.512 0.315 
(0.272) (0.468) (0.361) (0.300) (0.449) (0.372) (0.431) (0.500) (0.465) (0.429) (0.500) (0.464) 
Self Employed/Employer 
0.910 0.0154 0.800 0.761 0.0783 0.689 0.740 0.472 0.658 0.629 0.360 0.557 
(0.286) (0.123) (0.400) (0.426) (0.269) (0.463) (0.438) (0.499) (0.474) (0.483) (0.480) (0.497) 
Family Business/Home 
0.000433 0 0.000379 0.131 0 0.117 0.00649 0.00590 0.00631 0.0556 0.0668 0.0586 
(0.0208) (0) (0.0195) (0.338) (0) (0.322) (0.0803) (0.0766) (0.0792) (0.229) (0.250) (0.235) 
Other Work 
0.00779 0.0431 0.0121 0.00234 0 0.00209 0.00486 0.00528 0.00499 0.0680 0.0347 0.0592 
(0.0879) (0.203) (0.110) (0.0483) (0) (0.0457) (0.0695) (0.0725) (0.0704) (0.252) (0.183) (0.236) 
Armed Forces 
0.00433 0.0215 0.00645 0.00253 0.0345 0.00589 0.00340 0.0202 0.00856 0.000129 0.00112 0.000391 
(0.0657) (0.145) (0.0801) (0.0502) (0.183) (0.0765) (0.0582) (0.141) (0.0921) (0.0113) (0.0334) (0.0198) 
Legislator/Manager 
0.0104 0.0831 0.0193 0.0157 0.111 0.0258 0.00253 0.0176 0.00715 0.0166 0.0364 0.0218 
(0.101) (0.276) (0.138) (0.124) (0.315) (0.159) (0.0503) (0.132) (0.0843) (0.128) (0.187) (0.146) 
Professional 
0.00173 0.00308 0.00190 0.000877 0.0294 0.00388 0.0120 0.0679 0.0291 0.0212 0.107 0.0439 
(0.0416) (0.0555) (0.0435) (0.0296) (0.169) (0.0622) (0.109) (0.252) (0.168) (0.144) (0.309) (0.205) 
Technician/Associate 
Professional 
0.00476 0.191 0.0277 0.00405 0.105 0.0147 0.0172 0.0540 0.0285 0.0168 0.0475 0.0250 
(0.0688) (0.394) (0.164) (0.0635) (0.307) (0.120) (0.130) (0.226) (0.166) (0.129) (0.213) (0.156) 
Clerk 
0.468 0.0646 0.418 0.435 0.0999 0.400 0.00807 0.0371 0.0170 0.00885 0.0542 0.0209 
(0.499) (0.246) (0.493) (0.496) (0.300) (0.490) (0.0895) (0.189) (0.129) (0.0937) (0.226) (0.143) 
Service/Sales Workers 
0.0407 0.0954 0.0474 0.0754 0.120 0.0801 0.317 0.290 0.309 0.483 0.383 0.456 
(0.198) (0.294) (0.213) (0.264) (0.325) (0.271) (0.465) (0.454) (0.462) (0.500) (0.486) (0.498) 
Agricultural Workers 
0.170 0.0585 0.156 0.128 0.0584 0.120 0.0548 0.0107 0.0413 0.0439 0.0250 0.0389 
(0.376) (0.235) (0.363) (0.334) (0.235) (0.325) (0.228) (0.103) (0.199) (0.205) (0.156) (0.193) 
Craft/related Trades 
0.178 0.0677 0.165 0.214 0.180 0.210 0.336 0.232 0.305 0.246 0.155 0.222 
(0.383) (0.252) (0.371) (0.410) (0.385) (0.407) (0.473) (0.422) (0.460) (0.431) (0.362) (0.415) 
Plant/Machine 
Operators/Assemblers 
0.0428 0.120 0.0524 0.0438 0.0925 0.0489 0.0634 0.122 0.0813 0.0836 0.120 0.0931 
(0.203) (0.325) (0.223) (0.205) (0.290) (0.216) (0.244) (0.327) (0.273) (0.277) (0.325) (0.291) 
Elementary Occupation 
0.0792 0.295 0.106 0.0812 0.169 0.0904 0.185 0.149 0.174 0.0806 0.0716 0.0782 
(0.270) (0.457) (0.308) (0.273) (0.375) (0.287) (0.388) (0.356) (0.379) (0.272) (0.258) (0.268) 
Primary or Less 
0.569 0.209 0.525 0.509 0.185 0.475 0.501 0.257 0.427 0.394 0.221 0.348 
(0.495) (0.407) (0.499) (0.500) (0.389) (0.499) (0.500) (0.437) (0.495) (0.489) (0.415) (0.477) 
Lower Secondary 
0.381 0.532 0.400 0.386 0.377 0.385 0.389 0.457 0.410 0.436 0.381 0.422 
(0.486) (0.500) (0.490) (0.487) (0.485) (0.487) (0.488) (0.498) (0.492) (0.496) (0.486) (0.494) 
Upper Secondary 
0.0428 0.209 0.0634 0.0972 0.345 0.123 0.0992 0.208 0.133 0.149 0.254 0.177 
(0.203) (0.407) (0.244) (0.296) (0.476) (0.329) (0.299) (0.406) (0.339) (0.357) (0.435) (0.382) 
Tertiary/Post-Secondary 
0.00692 0.0492 0.0121 0.00734 0.0925 0.0163 0.0106 0.0775 0.0311 0.0199 0.144 0.0528 
(0.0829) (0.217) (0.110) (0.0854) (0.290) (0.127) (0.103) (0.267) (0.174) (0.140) (0.351) (0.224) 
Age 15-24 
0.173 0.108 0.165 0.133 0.116 0.131 0.162 0.108 0.145 0.157 0.101 0.142 
(0.378) (0.310) (0.371) (0.340) (0.321) (0.338) (0.369) (0.310) (0.353) (0.364) (0.302) (0.349) 
Age 25-34 
0.351 0.375 0.354 0.373 0.315 0.367 0.342 0.348 0.344 0.348 0.346 0.348 
(0.477) (0.485) (0.478) (0.484) (0.465) (0.482) (0.474) (0.477) (0.475) (0.476) (0.476) (0.476) 
Age 35-44 
0.250 0.289 0.255 0.276 0.325 0.281 0.271 0.301 0.280 0.279 0.303 0.285 
(0.433) (0.454) (0.436) (0.447) (0.469) (0.450) (0.445) (0.459) (0.449) (0.448) (0.460) (0.451) 
Age 45-54 
0.162 0.182 0.165 0.153 0.199 0.158 0.175 0.188 0.179 0.164 0.188 0.170 
(0.369) (0.386) (0.371) (0.360) (0.400) (0.365) (0.380) (0.391) (0.383) (0.370) (0.391) (0.376) 
Age 55-60 
0.0640 0.0462 0.0618 0.0644 0.0455 0.0624 0.0505 0.0550 0.0519 0.0523 0.0618 0.0548 
(0.245) (0.210) (0.241) (0.245) (0.209) (0.242) (0.219) (0.228) (0.222) (0.223) (0.241) (0.228) 
Household Head 
0.197 0.138 0.190 0.523 0.827 0.555 0.524 0.652 0.563 0.523 0.622 0.549 
(0.398) (0.346) (0.392) (0.500) (0.379) (0.497) (0.500) (0.476) (0.496) (0.500) (0.485) (0.498) 
non-Household Head 
0.803 0.862 0.810 0.477 0.173 0.445 0.476 0.348 0.437 0.477 0.378 0.451 
(0.398) (0.346) (0.392) (0.500) (0.379) (0.497) (0.500) (0.476) (0.496) (0.500) (0.485) (0.498) 
Male 
0.327 0.822 0.388 0.356 0.804 0.403 0.374 0.557 0.430 0.417 0.577 0.460 
(0.469) (0.383) (0.487) (0.479) (0.398) (0.491) (0.484) (0.497) (0.495) (0.493) (0.494) (0.498) 
Female 
0.673 0.178 0.612 0.644 0.196 0.597 0.626 0.443 0.570 0.583 0.423 0.540 
(0.469) (0.383) (0.487) (0.479) (0.398) (0.491) (0.484) (0.497) (0.495) (0.493) (0.494) (0.498) 
Household size 
5.189 4.520 5.106 4.983 4.683 4.951 4.606 4.176 4.474 4.575 4.307 4.504 
(3.026) (2.930) (3.022) (2.647) (2.583) (2.642) (2.825) (2.455) (2.724) (2.825) (2.466) (2.737) 
Observations 2636     3816     5027     9564     
 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6 
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics – Rwanda, by Survey Wave 
 
Rwanda_EICV1 Rwanda_EICV 2 Rwanda_EICV 3 
  Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total 
Annual Net Income 
2167392.4 788215.9 1747326.2 674053.3 579826.7 658604.7 392431.1 1383873.3 459597.7 
(4312098.5) (1448269.4) (3737437.8) (1390648.2) (399001.7) (1282174.1) (1430492.6) (2861954.5) (1588792.1) 
Quasi-Public 
0.0253 0.135 0.0588 0.0362 0.166 0.0574 0.00547 0.0701 0.00985 
(0.157) (0.343) (0.235) (0.187) (0.372) (0.233) (0.0738) (0.255) (0.0988) 
Private Employee 
0.537 0.865 0.637 0.392 0.496 0.409 0.128 0.344 0.143 
(0.499) (0.343) (0.481) (0.488) (0.500) (0.492) (0.335) (0.475) (0.350) 
Self Employed/Employer 
0.433 0 0.301 0.193 0.169 0.189 0.0341 0.120 0.0400 
(0.496) (0) (0.459) (0.395) (0.375) (0.392) (0.182) (0.326) (0.196) 
Family Business/Home 
0.00427 0 0.00297 0.351 0.170 0.321 0.830 0.464 0.806 
(0.0653) (0) (0.0544) (0.477) (0.376) (0.467) (0.375) (0.499) (0.396) 
Other Work 
0 0 0 0.0278 0 0.0232 0.00149 0.00137 0.00148 
(0) (0) (0) (0.164) (0) (0.151) (0.0385) (0.0370) (0.0384) 
Armed Forces 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Legislator/Manager 
0.0152 0.119 0.0468 0.0227 0.139 0.0417 0.00955 0.153 0.0193 
(0.122) (0.324) (0.211) (0.149) (0.346) (0.200) (0.0972) (0.360) (0.137) 
Professional 
0.00689 0.0992 0.0350 0.0124 0.0654 0.0210 0.00331 0.0723 0.00798 
(0.0827) (0.299) (0.184) (0.110) (0.247) (0.144) (0.0574) (0.259) (0.0890) 
Technician/Associate Professional 
0.00723 0.121 0.0418 0.00575 0.104 0.0219 0.00581 0.0865 0.0113 
(0.0847) (0.326) (0.200) (0.0756) (0.306) (0.146) (0.0760) (0.281) (0.106) 
Clerk 
0.335 0.0286 0.242 0.138 0.143 0.139 0.0806 0.0861 0.0810 
(0.472) (0.167) (0.428) (0.345) (0.351) (0.346) (0.272) (0.281) (0.273) 
Service/Sales Workers 
0.234 0.358 0.272 0.156 0.248 0.171 0.0651 0.192 0.0737 
(0.424) (0.480) (0.445) (0.363) (0.433) (0.377) (0.247) (0.394) (0.261) 
Agricultural Workers 
0.0931 0.106 0.0969 0.366 0.164 0.333 0.654 0.273 0.628 
(0.291) (0.308) (0.296) (0.482) (0.371) (0.471) (0.476) (0.446) (0.483) 
Craft/related Trades 
0.0635 0.0282 0.0528 0.0538 0.0299 0.0499 0.0385 0.0308 0.0380 
(0.244) (0.166) (0.224) (0.226) (0.170) (0.218) (0.192) (0.173) (0.191) 
Plant/Machine 
Operators/Assemblers 
0.0460 0.0449 0.0457 0.0395 0.0331 0.0384 0.0160 0.0229 0.0164 
(0.210) (0.207) (0.209) (0.195) (0.179) (0.192) (0.125) (0.150) (0.127) 
Elementary Occupation 
0.199 0.0961 0.168 0.206 0.0720 0.184 0.127 0.0836 0.125 
(0.399) (0.295) (0.374) (0.404) (0.259) (0.387) (0.334) (0.277) (0.330) 
Primary or Less 
0.724 0.474 0.647 0.740 0.452 0.693 0.941 0.445 0.907 
(0.447) (0.500) (0.478) (0.438) (0.498) (0.461) (0.236) (0.497) (0.290) 
Lower Secondary 
0.101 0.152 0.117 0.0240 0.0340 0.0256 0.0183 0.0437 0.0201 
(0.302) (0.360) (0.321) (0.153) (0.181) (0.158) (0.134) (0.205) (0.140) 
Upper Secondary 
0.0449 0.218 0.0977 0.0934 0.363 0.138 0.0353 0.327 0.0551 
(0.207) (0.414) (0.297) (0.291) (0.481) (0.345) (0.185) (0.469) (0.228) 
Tertiary/Post-Secondary 
0.00621 0.0558 0.0213 0.00641 0.0937 0.0207 0.00554 0.184 0.0177 
(0.0786) (0.230) (0.145) (0.0798) (0.292) (0.142) (0.0742) (0.388) (0.132) 
Age 15-24 
0.434 0.387 0.420 0.292 0.243 0.284 0.286 0.211 0.281 
(0.496) (0.487) (0.494) (0.455) (0.429) (0.451) (0.452) (0.408) (0.449) 
Age 25-34 
0.300 0.335 0.311 0.331 0.333 0.331 0.326 0.388 0.330 
(0.459) (0.472) (0.463) (0.471) (0.472) (0.471) (0.469) (0.487) (0.470) 
Age 35-44 
0.164 0.177 0.168 0.215 0.228 0.217 0.194 0.257 0.199 
(0.371) (0.382) (0.374) (0.411) (0.420) (0.412) (0.396) (0.437) (0.399) 
Age 45-54 
0.0826 0.0913 0.0852 0.126 0.151 0.130 0.143 0.122 0.141 
(0.275) (0.288) (0.279) (0.332) (0.359) (0.337) (0.350) (0.328) (0.349) 
Age 55-60 
0.0185 0.0101 0.0160 0.0357 0.0443 0.0371 0.0508 0.0220 0.0489 
(0.135) (0.100) (0.125) (0.186) (0.206) (0.189) (0.220) (0.147) (0.216) 
Household Head 
0.432 0.422 0.429 0.670 0.589 0.657 0.495 0.553 0.499 
(0.496) (0.494) (0.495) (0.470) (0.493) (0.475) (0.500) (0.497) (0.500) 
non-Household Head 
0.568 0.578 0.571 0.330 0.411 0.343 0.505 0.447 0.501 
(0.496) (0.494) (0.495) (0.470) (0.493) (0.475) (0.500) (0.497) (0.500) 
Male 
0.627 0.611 0.622 0.793 0.681 0.775 0.546 0.668 0.555 
(0.484) (0.488) (0.485) (0.405) (0.467) (0.418) (0.498) (0.471) (0.497) 
Female 
0.373 0.389 0.378 0.207 0.319 0.225 0.454 0.332 0.445 
(0.484) (0.488) (0.485) (0.405) (0.467) (0.418) (0.498) (0.471) (0.497) 
Household size 
5.986 6.095 6.019 5.483 6.298 5.617 5.207 5.908 5.254 
(2.993) (2.653) (2.893) (2.488) (2.642) (2.532) (2.213) (2.626) (2.250) 
Observations 1664 
 
                2689 
 
              18466 
 
                
 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from EICV 1-3 
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics – Tanzania, by Survey Wave 
 
Tanzania_2006 Tanzania_2014 
  Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total 
Annual Net Income 
7970667.3 4219696.9 7626953.6 1851450.7 4187563.4 2281174.2 
(13632954.2) (5557957.2) (13146200.4) (2756351.8) (5461851.8) (3536261.6) 
Quasi-Public 
0.0233 0.338 0.0522 0.00962 0.0900 0.0244 
(0.151) (0.473) (0.222) (0.0976) (0.286) (0.154) 
Private Employee 
0.273 0.586 0.302 0.169 0.584 0.246 
(0.446) (0.493) (0.459) (0.375) (0.493) (0.431) 
Self Employed/Employer 
0.680 0.0758 0.624 0.490 0.259 0.447 
(0.467) (0.265) (0.484) (0.500) (0.438) (0.497) 
Family Business/Home 
0.0236 0 0.0214 0.331 0.0664 0.282 
(0.152) (0) (0.145) (0.471) (0.249) (0.450) 
Other Work 
0.000210 0 0.000191 0 0 0 
(0.0145) (0) (0.0138) (0) (0) (0) 
Armed Forces 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Legislator/Manager 
0.00170 0.0240 0.00375 0.00265 0.0285 0.00741 
(0.0412) (0.153) (0.0611) (0.0514) (0.166) (0.0857) 
Professional 
0.00853 0.0938 0.0163 0.000851 0.0501 0.00991 
(0.0920) (0.292) (0.127) (0.0292) (0.218) (0.0991) 
Technician/Associate Professional 
0.0237 0.0917 0.0299 0.00695 0.0471 0.0143 
(0.152) (0.289) (0.170) (0.0831) (0.212) (0.119) 
Clerk 
0.00794 0.0772 0.0143 0.00377 0.0567 0.0135 
(0.0888) (0.267) (0.119) (0.0613) (0.231) (0.115) 
Service/Sales Workers 
0.466 0.269 0.448 0.191 0.286 0.208 
(0.499) (0.444) (0.497) (0.393) (0.452) (0.406) 
Agricultural Workers 
0.0348 0.0171 0.0332 0.334 0.0978 0.290 
(0.183) (0.130) (0.179) (0.472) (0.297) (0.454) 
Craft/related Trades 
0.223 0.162 0.217 0.153 0.122 0.147 
(0.416) (0.369) (0.412) (0.360) (0.327) (0.354) 
Plant/Machine Operators/Assemblers 
0.0514 0.134 0.0590 0.0394 0.189 0.0669 
(0.221) (0.341) (0.236) (0.194) (0.392) (0.250) 
Elementary Occupation 
0.183 0.131 0.179 0.269 0.123 0.243 
(0.387) (0.337) (0.383) (0.444) (0.328) (0.429) 
Primary or Less 
0.882 0.563 0.853 0.886 0.610 0.835 
(0.323) (0.496) (0.355) (0.318) (0.488) (0.371) 
Lower Secondary 
0.108 0.276 0.123 0.0989 0.251 0.127 
(0.310) (0.447) (0.329) (0.299) (0.434) (0.333) 
Upper Secondary 
0.00925 0.132 0.0205 0.0128 0.0727 0.0238 
(0.0957) (0.339) (0.142) (0.112) (0.260) (0.152) 
Tertiary/Post-Secondary 
0.00107 0.0284 0.00357 0.00212 0.0662 0.0139 
(0.0326) (0.166) (0.0597) (0.0460) (0.249) (0.117) 
Age 15-24 
0.237 0.0826 0.223 0.196 0.149 0.187 
(0.425) (0.275) (0.416) (0.397) (0.356) (0.390) 
Age 25-34 
0.388 0.335 0.383 0.333 0.374 0.341 
(0.487) (0.472) (0.486) (0.471) (0.484) (0.474) 
Age 35-44 
0.233 0.281 0.237 0.278 0.290 0.280 
(0.423) (0.450) (0.425) (0.448) (0.454) (0.449) 
Age 45-54 
0.105 0.230 0.117 0.141 0.156 0.144 
(0.307) (0.421) (0.321) (0.348) (0.363) (0.351) 
Age 55-60 
0.0377 0.0723 0.0409 0.0517 0.0314 0.0480 
(0.190) (0.259) (0.198) (0.221) (0.174) (0.214) 
Household Head 
0.554 0.771 0.574 0.554 0.705 0.582 
(0.497) (0.421) (0.494) (0.497) (0.456) (0.493) 
non-Household Head 
0.446 0.229 0.426 0.446 0.295 0.418 
(0.497) (0.421) (0.494) (0.497) (0.456) (0.493) 
Male 
0.604 0.759 0.619 0.540 0.745 0.578 
(0.489) (0.428) (0.486) (0.498) (0.436) (0.494) 
Female 
0.396 0.241 0.381 0.460 0.255 0.422 
(0.489) (0.428) (0.486) (0.498) (0.436) (0.494) 
Household size 
4.665 4.507 4.651 4.902 4.755 4.875 
(2.654) (2.421) (2.634) (2.759) (3.304) (2.867) 
Observations 7383 
  
11877 
  
 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from IFLS 2006-2014  
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Table A.4: Summary Statistics – Uganda, by Survey Wave 
 
Uganda_NPL_2009/10 Uganda_NPL_2010/11 Uganda_NPL_2011/12 Uganda_NPL_2013/14 
  Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total Informal Formal Total 
Annual Net 
Income 
3558578.
6 
5544654.
8 
3924323.
6 
3655171.
0 
4728000.
5 
3842669.
5 
3303218.
4 
5443322.
7 
3697761.
7 
2580708.
2 
4770143.
1 
2962533.
3 
(7121874.
0) 
(1104733
1.0) 
(8018143.
1) 
(7023130.
7) 
(7235529.
3) 
(7066692.
2) 
(4265411.
5) 
(6462386.
7) 
(4813614.
6) 
(2845697.
8) 
(4931527.
8) 
(3404860.
7) 
Quasi-Public 
0.0206 0.173 0.0487 0.0320 0.163 0.0549 0.0409 0.172 0.0650 0.0341 0.224 0.0672 
(0.142) (0.380) (0.215) (0.176) (0.371) (0.228) (0.198) (0.379) (0.247) (0.182) (0.418) (0.251) 
Private 
Employee 
0.521 0.689 0.552 0.485 0.753 0.532 0.514 0.755 0.559 0.488 0.607 0.509 
(0.500) (0.465) (0.498) (0.500) (0.433) (0.499) (0.500) (0.432) (0.497) (0.500) (0.490) (0.500) 
Self 
Employed/Emp
loyer 
0.00790 0.0280 0.0116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0.0886) (0.166) (0.107) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Family 
Business/Home 
0.450 0.110 0.387 0.483 0.0839 0.413 0.445 0.0731 0.376 0.478 0.169 0.424 
(0.498) (0.314) (0.488) (0.500) (0.278) (0.493) (0.497) (0.261) (0.485) (0.500) (0.376) (0.495) 
Other Work 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Armed Forces 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00165 0.0125 0.00355 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.0406) (0.112) (0.0595) 
Legislator/Man
ager 
0 0.0201 0.00371 0.00176 0 0.00146 0.000261 0.0459 0.00867 0.0110 0.0459 0.0171 
(0) (0.141) (0.0608) (0.0420) (0) (0.0382) (0.0162) (0.210) (0.0928) (0.104) (0.210) (0.130) 
Professional 
0.0309 0.247 0.0706 0.00857 0.117 0.0275 0.00113 0.204 0.0385 0.0851 0.331 0.128 
(0.173) (0.433) (0.256) (0.0923) (0.323) (0.164) (0.0337) (0.405) (0.193) (0.279) (0.472) (0.334) 
Technician/Ass
ociate 
Professional 
0.0484 0.167 0.0703 0.0666 0.236 0.0962 0.122 0.281 0.151 0.0285 0.104 0.0417 
(0.215) (0.374) (0.256) (0.249) (0.427) (0.295) (0.327) (0.452) (0.358) (0.167) (0.307) (0.200) 
Clerk 
0.00717 0.0279 0.0110 0.00768 0.0718 0.0189 0.00470 0.00386 0.00455 0.0107 0.0637 0.0199 
(0.0844) (0.165) (0.104) (0.0874) (0.259) (0.136) (0.0685) (0.0623) (0.0673) (0.103) (0.245) (0.140) 
Service/Sales 
Workers 
0.169 0.0955 0.156 0.181 0.136 0.173 0.177 0.0627 0.156 0.144 0.0787 0.132 
(0.375) (0.295) (0.363) (0.385) (0.345) (0.378) (0.382) (0.243) (0.363) (0.351) (0.270) (0.339) 
Agricultural 
Workers 
0.0949 0.0108 0.0794 0.111 0.121 0.113 0.0796 0.0304 0.0705 0.0892 0.0160 0.0764 
(0.293) (0.104) (0.271) (0.315) (0.327) (0.317) (0.271) (0.172) (0.256) (0.285) (0.126) (0.266) 
Craft/related 
Trades 
0.117 0.0314 0.101 0.107 0.0294 0.0933 0.0997 0.00790 0.0827 0.0673 0.0393 0.0624 
(0.321) (0.175) (0.302) (0.309) (0.170) (0.291) (0.300) (0.0889) (0.276) (0.251) (0.195) (0.242) 
Plant/Machine 
Operators/Asse
mblers 
0.0332 0.105 0.0464 0.0282 0.0333 0.0291 0.0402 0.129 0.0567 0.0338 0.0322 0.0335 
(0.179) (0.308) (0.211) (0.166) (0.180) (0.168) (0.197) (0.337) (0.231) (0.181) (0.177) (0.180) 
Elementary 
Occupation 
0.499 0.296 0.462 0.489 0.255 0.448 0.476 0.235 0.432 0.529 0.276 0.485 
(0.500) (0.458) (0.499) (0.500) (0.438) (0.498) (0.500) (0.426) (0.496) (0.499) (0.449) (0.500) 
Primary or Less 
0.733 0.419 0.675 0.734 0.398 0.675 0.662 0.255 0.587 0.689 0.345 0.629 
(0.443) (0.495) (0.469) (0.442) (0.492) (0.469) (0.473) (0.437) (0.493) (0.463) (0.477) (0.483) 
Lower 
Secondary 
0.167 0.233 0.179 0.171 0.269 0.188 0.221 0.328 0.240 0.175 0.173 0.175 
(0.373) (0.424) (0.384) (0.376) (0.445) (0.391) (0.415) (0.471) (0.428) (0.380) (0.380) (0.380) 
Upper 
Secondary 
0.0360 0.0765 0.0435 0.0335 0.0678 0.0395 0.0575 0.0773 0.0612 0.0527 0.0828 0.0579 
(0.187) (0.267) (0.204) (0.180) (0.253) (0.195) (0.233) (0.268) (0.240) (0.224) (0.277) (0.234) 
Tertiary/Post-
Secondary 
0.0635 0.272 0.102 0.0622 0.265 0.0976 0.0598 0.340 0.111 0.0840 0.399 0.139 
(0.244) (0.447) (0.303) (0.242) (0.443) (0.297) (0.237) (0.476) (0.315) (0.278) (0.491) (0.346) 
Age 15-24 
0.354 0.0801 0.304 0.379 0.160 0.340 0.440 0.268 0.409 0.358 0.172 0.325 
(0.479) (0.273) (0.460) (0.485) (0.368) (0.474) (0.497) (0.445) (0.492) (0.480) (0.378) (0.469) 
Age 25-34 
0.335 0.383 0.344 0.329 0.423 0.345 0.290 0.382 0.307 0.316 0.437 0.337 
(0.473) (0.488) (0.475) (0.470) (0.496) (0.476) (0.454) (0.488) (0.462) (0.465) (0.498) (0.473) 
Age 35-44 
0.190 0.394 0.227 0.174 0.337 0.203 0.168 0.265 0.186 0.204 0.267 0.215 
(0.392) (0.491) (0.419) (0.380) (0.475) (0.402) (0.374) (0.443) (0.389) (0.403) (0.444) (0.411) 
Age 45-54 
0.0925 0.100 0.0940 0.0936 0.0654 0.0886 0.0677 0.0717 0.0684 0.0935 0.0962 0.0940 
(0.290) (0.302) (0.292) (0.291) (0.248) (0.284) (0.251) (0.259) (0.253) (0.291) (0.296) (0.292) 
Age 55-60 
0.0280 0.0429 0.0307 0.0249 0.0148 0.0231 0.0338 0.0138 0.0301 0.0287 0.0283 0.0286 
(0.165) (0.203) (0.173) (0.156) (0.121) (0.150) (0.181) (0.117) (0.171) (0.167) (0.166) (0.167) 
Household 
Head 
0.433 0.706 0.483 0.498 0.616 0.518 0.514 0.590 0.528 0.444 0.450 0.445 
(0.496) (0.457) (0.500) (0.500) (0.489) (0.500) (0.500) (0.494) (0.500) (0.497) (0.499) (0.497) 
non-HHhead 
0.567 0.294 0.517 0.502 0.384 0.482 0.486 0.410 0.472 0.556 0.550 0.555 
(0.496) (0.457) (0.500) (0.500) (0.489) (0.500) (0.500) (0.494) (0.500) (0.497) (0.499) (0.497) 
Male 
0.696 0.653 0.688 0.715 0.511 0.679 0.702 0.612 0.686 0.715 0.553 0.687 
(0.460) (0.478) (0.464) (0.452) (0.502) (0.467) (0.458) (0.489) (0.465) (0.452) (0.499) (0.464) 
Female 
0.304 0.347 0.312 0.285 0.489 0.321 0.298 0.388 0.314 0.285 0.447 0.313 
(0.460) (0.478) (0.464) (0.452) (0.502) (0.467) (0.458) (0.489) (0.465) (0.452) (0.499) (0.464) 
Household size 
7.022 6.236 6.877 6.552 5.434 6.356 6.311 6.106 6.274 6.233 6.075 6.205 
(5.167) (3.544) (4.916) (3.819) (3.457) (3.780) (4.371) (4.405) (4.374) (3.534) (3.065) (3.455) 
Observations 719     697     688     899     
 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014 
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Figure A.1: Distribution of aggregate Formal vs Informal Income by Country, Survey Wave and Gender 
 a) Ghana 1991 b) Ghana 1998 c) Ghana 2005/06 d) Ghana 2012 
Female 
    
Male 
    
 e) Rwanda 2000 f) Rwanda 2005 g) Rwanda 2011  
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 h) Tanzania 2006 i) Tanzania 2014   
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 j) Uganda 2009/10 k) Uganda 2010/11 l) Uganda 2011/12 m) Uganda 2013/14 
Female 
    
Male 
    
 Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 
2009/2010 – 2013/2014 
 
Table A.5: Elasticity of Formal Work – Age Categories 25-60 and >15  
  
Age 25-60 Age >15 
  
Disaggregated educ. categories Aggregate educ. categories Disaggregated educ. categories Aggregate educ. categories 
  
No controls All controls No controls All controls No controls All controls No controls All controls 
 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
a)  
Ghana 
Elasticity 0.229 -0.013 0.191 -0.017 0.032 -0.016 0.009 -0.011 
Std. Dev. (0.251) (0.108) (0.272) (0.119) (0.171) (0.059) (0.171) (0.059) 
Group N 105 105 87 87 148 148 128 128 
b)  
Rwanda 
Elasticity -1.280*** -0.06 -1.074*** 0.147 -0.646*** 0.378 -0.508** 0.521** 
Std. Dev. (0.248) (0.261) (0.23) (0.255) (0.234) (0.285) (0.237) (0.257) 
Group N 65 65 53 53 85 85 72 72 
c) 
Tanzania 
Elasticity 0.439** 0.034 0.443** -0.068 0.474*** 0.03 0.483*** -0.029 
Std. Dev. (0.186) (0.443) (0.192) (0.497) (0.161) (0.335) (0.168) (0.348) 
Group N 51 51 43 43 69 69 60 60 
d)  
Uganda 
Elasticity -0.074 -0.111 0.01 -0.119* 0.23 -0.085 0.308 -0.098 
Std. Dev. (0.173) (0.08) (0.194) (0.072) (0.217) (0.107) (0.216) (0.099) 
Group N 54 54 55 55 76 76 80 80 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models (1) have no controls and models (2) control for the full set of demographic characteristics and time dummies3. Group N indicates the 
number of grouped observations.  
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014 
 
Table A.6 : Elasticity of Formal Work – Heterogeneity Analysis of Different Age Categories (15-60 and >15) 
  
Age 25-60 (all controls) Age >15 (all controls) 
  
disaggregated educ. categories aggregate educ. categories disaggregated educ. categories aggregate educ. categories 
  
All men women All men women All men women All men women 
 
 (3) (4) (5) (3) (4) (5) (3) (4) (5) (3) (4) (5) 
a)  
Ghana 
Elasticity -0.033 -0.072 0.08 -0.038 -0.195 0.184 -0.017 -0.197 0.066 -0.011 -0.263** 0.097 
Std. Dev. (0.119) (0.198) (0.133) (0.131) (0.152) (0.152) (0.076) (0.161) (0.064) (0.077) (0.131) (0.061) 
Group N 103 58 45 85 45 40 141 82 59 122 68 54 
b)  
Rwanda 
Elasticity -0.06 -0.203 0.136 0.147 0.138 0.123 0.378 -0.113 0.687*** 0.521** 0.128 0.702*** 
Std. Dev. (0.261) (0.396) (0.31) (0.25)5 (0.449) (0.276) (0.285) (0.312) (0.263) (0.257) (0.34) (0.263) 
Group N 65 38 25 53 30 23 85 50 35 72 41 31 
c)  
Tanzania 
Elasticity 0.034 -0.731* 0.277 -0.068 -0.964** 0.219 -0.032 -0.657** -0.119 -0.102 -0.807** -0.213 
Std. Dev. (0.443) (0.393) (0.361) (0.497) (0.406) (0.465) (0.357) (0.312) (0.438) (0.375) (0.331) (0.47) 
Group N 51 29 22 43 24 19 68 40 28 59 34 25 
d)  
Uganda 
Elasticity -0.111 -0.112 0.04 -0.119* -0.154 0.055 -0.085 -0.062 -0.033 -0.098 -0.096 -0.07 
Std. Dev. (0.08) (0.133) (0.08) (0.072) (0.105) (0.093) (0.107) (0.122) (0.197) (0.099) (0.106) (0.188) 
Group N 54 35 19 55 35 20 76 47 29 80 48 32 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models include the full set of demographic characteristics and time dummies4 and are restricted to individuals with above minimum wage 
income. Group N indicates the number of grouped observations.  
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014. 
 
                                                          
3 These are year dummies, except for in Uganda where surveys are split over two years. In this case the year 
dummies are replaced by dummies for each wave. 
4 These are year dummies, except for in Uganda where surveys are split over two years. In this case the year 
dummies are replaced by dummies for each wave. 
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Table A.7 : Elasticity of Formal Work - detailed educational categories age 15-60 (only employees) 
    
above minimum wage 
  
N
o 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
(m
en
) 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
(w
om
en
) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a) Ghana 
Elasticity 0.343*** 0.023 0.026 0.05 -0.018 
Std. Dev. (0.11) (0.036) (0.039) (0.049) (0.08) 
Group N 93 93 88 57 31 
b) Rwanda 
Elasticity 0.045 -0.389** -0.389** -0.166 -0.830*** 
Std. Dev. (0.17) (0.171) (0.171) (0.218) (0.256) 
Group N 60 60 60 35 25 
c) Tanzania 
Elasticity 0.504* 0.152 0.152 -0.035 -0.082 
Std. Dev. (0.258) (0.185) (0.185) (0.467) (0.156) 
Group N 50 50 50 27 23 
d) Uganda 
Elasticity 0.163 -0.112 -0.112 -0.103 -0.239 
Std. Dev. ((0.171) (0.098) (0.098) (0.116) (0.151) 
Group N 62 62 62 40 21 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0., Group N indicates the number of grouped observations.  
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014. 
 
Table A.8 : Elasticity of Formal Work – Alternative 2 with aggregate educational categories, age, occupation and urbanity status  (aged 15-60 ) 
    above minimum wage 
  
N
o 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
(m
en
) 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
(w
om
en
) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a) Ghana 
Elasticity 0.184 -0.043 -0.05 -0.046 0.002 
Std. Dev. (0.13) (0.074) (0.102) (0.13) (0.132) 
Group N 278 278 246 145 101 
b) Rwanda 
Elasticity -0.301 0.362 0.362 0.159 0.77 
Std. Dev. (0.291) (0.27) (0.27) (0.256) (0.996) 
Group N 154 154 154 96 55 
c) Tanzania 
Elasticity 0.545*** -0.074 -0.138 -0.303 -0.107 
Std. Dev. (0.15) (0.215) (0.28) (0.268) (0.36) 
Group N 139 138 138 82 54 
d) Uganda 
Elasticity -0.002 -0.045 -0.045 -0.071 0.391 
Std. Dev. (0.341) (0.119) (0.119) (0.103) (0.622) 
Group N 42 42 42 27 15 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Group N indicates the number of grouped observations.  
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014. 
 
Table A.9 : Elasticity of Formal Work – Alternative 3 with aggregate age, occupation and urbanity status  with additional controls  (aged 15-60 ) 
    above minimum wage 
  
N
o 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
(m
en
) 
A
ll 
co
nt
ro
ls 
(w
om
en
) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a) Ghana 
Elasticity 0.654*** 0.06 0.061 0.131 -0.013 
Std. Dev. (0.188) (0.1) (0.159) (0.241) (0.175) 
Group N 202 202 178 112 66 
b) Rwanda 
Elasticity -0.695*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.207 0.972 
Std. Dev. (0.226) (0.221) (0.221) (0.233) (0.716) 
Group N 146 146 145 90 55 
c) Tanzania 
Elasticity 0.473*** 0.05 0.046 0.052 -0.321 
Std. Dev. (0.151) (0.235) (0.239) (0.31) (0.426) 
Group N 118 112 112 67 45 
d) Uganda 
Elasticity 0.25 -0.09 -0.09 -0.061 -0.331 
Std. Dev. (0.239) (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.394) 
Group N 88 88 88 57 31 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Group N indicates the number of grouped observations. Additional 
controls are the share of married individuals and the share of individuals with children in the households, the share of employees/self-employed 
individuals and the share of household heads in the respective group. 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014. 
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Table A.10 : Determinants of Formal /Informal Sector Employment Choice (aged 15-60 ) 
  Ghana Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
VARIABLES formal formal formal formal 
      2.survey round -0.381*** -0.430*** 0.508*** -0.0445 
 
(0.0382) (0.0506) (0.0255) (0.0725) 
3.survey round 0.0994*** -0.723*** -0.196*** -0.0391 
 
(0.0372) (0.0452) (0.0271) (0.0727) 
4.survey round -0.204*** -0.235***  -0.115* 
 
(0.0365) (0.0325)  (0.0697) 2.sex -0.263***   0.187*** 
 
(0.0261)   (0.0610) 1.urban 0.0802*** 0.160*** 0.148*** 0.163*** 
 
(0.0256) (0.0351) (0.0326) (0.0549) 
2.educ2 0.325*** 0.622*** 0.744*** 0.532*** 
 
(0.0258) (0.0570) (0.0278) (0.0703) 
3.educ2 0.640*** 1.210*** 1.179*** 0.567*** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0410) (0.0564) (0.113) 
4.educ2 1.464*** 1.650*** 1.313*** 0.878*** 
 
(0.0508) (0.0755) (0.0944) (0.0898) 
wage 7.53e-06*** 1.52e-08** 1.59e-08*** 2.62e-08*** 
 
(1.87e-06) (7.55e-09) (2.67e-09) (9.03e-09) 
2.comp_occup_cat -1.281*** -1.186*** -1.255*** -1.021*** 
 
(0.0364) (0.0554) (0.0497) (0.0966) 
3.comp_occup_cat -0.885*** -0.119** -1.123*** -0.815*** 
 
(0.0384) (0.0537) (0.0465) (0.0897) 
4.comp_occup_cat -1.009*** -1.196*** -1.287*** -1.004*** 
 
(0.0387) (0.0468) (0.0488) (0.0786) 
2.age_group 0.253*** 0.0681* 0.315*** 0.446*** 
 
(0.0364) (0.0412) (0.0394) (0.0776) 
3.age_group 0.436*** -0.00242 0.593*** 0.545*** 
 
(0.0413) (0.0528) (0.0473) (0.0936) 
1.married 0.164*** 0.259*** -0.159*** 0.112** 
 
(0.0225) (0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0548) 
1.kids -0.0612 0.207*** -0.688*** 0.109 
 
(0.124) (0.0645) (0.138) (0.165) 
1.hhhead 0.0828*** 0.0811** 0.202*** 0.119* 
 
(0.0260) (0.0361) (0.0286) (0.0630) 
1.employee 0.413*** 0.0616* 0.956*** -0.266*** 
 
(0.0257) (0.0369) (0.0261) (0.0547) 
Constant -0.268*** -0.217*** -1.104*** -0.816*** 
 
(0.0572) (0.0690) (0.0650) (0.120) 
     Observations 21,358 23,308 21,227 3,826 
      
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6, EICV 1-3, IFLS 2006-2014 and NPL 2009/2010 – 2013/2014. 
 
 
Figure A.2: Tax rate over uprated formal wages 
a) Ghana b) Rwanda 
 
 
c) Tanzania d) Uganda 
  
Source: Authors’ own estimations based on survey data from GLSS 3-6 
Note: Give the real income growth between the survey rounds the income in the earlier survey rounds has been uprated by the men income 
growth rate between those years. The first round for Ghana GLSS3 is excluded here as no precise tax rate information is available for those years.  
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